Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Tobias, Carl W.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1989
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 270 (1989).
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Carl Tobias t 
The public interest litigant is no longer a nascent phenomenon 
in American jurisprudence. Born of the need of large numbers of 
people who individually lack the economic wherewithal or the logis-
tical capacity to vindicate important social values or their own spe-
cific interests through the courts, these litigants now participate 
actively in much federal civil litigation: public law litigation.1 De-
spite the pervasive presence of public interest litigants, the federal 
judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particularly when 
applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts 
have applied numerous Rules in ways that disadvantage public inter-
est litigants, especially in contrast to traditional litigants, such as pri-
vate individuals, corporations, and the government. 
These developments were not inevitable. Most of the Rules, as 
adopted originally in 1938 and as amended subsequently, did not 
anticipate, but were compatible with, public law litigation and public 
interest litigants' involvement in federal civil litigation. Indeed, cer-
tain ideas underlying the Rules as a set of litigating principles may 
have facilitated public law litigation and public interest litigants' ex-
panding participation in civil suits. Nonetheless, a number of 
judges has enforced numerous Rules in ways that adversely affect 
these litigants and which now constitute a discernible pattern. The 
fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules affords an auspicious occa-
sion to explore the federal courts' application of the Rules to public 
law litigation and the consequences of that judicial treatment. 
The first section of this Article surveys the history of the Rules 
and chronicles the rise of public interest litigants and their growing 
involvement in federal civil litigation. The review shows that nearly 
t Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Rich Freer, Bill Luneburg, 
Rick Marcus, Michael Risinger, Peggy Sanner, and Allan Stein for valuable suggestions, 
to Brenda Numerof and Kathy Rightmyer for helpful research assistance, to the Harris 
Trust for generous continuing support, and to Violet Pasha for typing this Article. Er-
rors that remain are mine. 
I Public law litigation comprises lawsuits which seek to vindicate important social 
values that affect numerous individuals and entities. For discussion of much of this liti-
gation's salient characteristics, see infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. Public in-
terest litigants are people or entities that pursue such litigation. For helpful, recent 
analysis of public law litigation and public interest litigants, see N. ARON, LIBERTI AND 
JUSTICE FOR ALL PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989). 
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all of the Rules, as promulgated in 1938 and as revised thereafter, 
were consistent with, and even may have promoted, public law liti-
gation and public interest litigants' increasing activity. When the 
coalescence of numerous developments significantly transformed 
the character of considerable federal civil litigation, federal courts 
confronted many unforeseeable issues for whose resolution the 
Rules afforded little guidance. The second part of the Article, 
therefore, analyzes how the federal judiciary has addressed a 
number of these issues. The evaluation reveals that many courts 
have enforced numerous Rules in ways that have adversely affected 
public interest litigants. Indeed, application of all these Rules may 
have had cumulative impacts and even chilling effects on the liti-
gants. Because the assessment also indicates that courts can and 
should enforce the Rules with greater solicitude for public interest 
litigants, the final section offers suggestions for so applying them 
and for future work on the Federal Rules and public law litigation 
during the next half-century of the Rules' application.2 
1 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES AND PuBLIC 
LAW LITIGATION 
The half-century history of the Federal Rules of Civil Proc.edure 
2 I recognize that the advisability and the validity of certain forms of public law 
litigation inspire controversy. For discussion of Supreme Court treatment of some of 
the litigation, see Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Laur Litigation and 
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; Fallon, Of 
justiciability, Remedies, and Public Laur Litigation: Notes on the jurispnulence of Lyons, 59 
N.·Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984). For a thorough list of commentary, much of which analyzes the 
advisability and validity of public law litigation, see Fallon, supra, at 1 n. l, 2 n.3. For 
representative treatment criticizing the litigation, see generally D. HOROWITZ, THE 
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equi-
table Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). For representative treatment favoring the 
litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the judge in Public Laur Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Laur Litigation]; Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Tmn-Fore-
urord: The Forms of justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). Cj Fletcher, The Discretionary Consti-
tution: Institutional Remedies and judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE LJ. 635 (1982) 
(representative, comparatively neutral treatment). For purposes of this Article, it is 
preferable to leave open the question of legitimacy and to admit that it may be insolv-
able. This approach does not purport to resolve the very proposition some have con-
tended must be proved, and cogent arguments against the validity of public law 
litigation have been posited. Barring dramatic reversals on the order of Congressional 
repeal of the civil rights laws, however, litigants will not cease seeking to vindicate im-
portant social values implicated by the litigation and judges will not stop entertaining 
those suits. Thus, it is realistic to assume that some public law litigation will be pursued 
and to explore how it might be treated most efficaciously. One need not necessarily 
favor such litig-.nion to support its effective resolution when the litigation instituted. 
This study and the work proposed for the future, by collecting and analyzing data, 
should contribute to more informed debate while indicating contexts in which public law 
litigation is more or less advisable and perhaps inappropriate. 
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divides into four time frames for the purpose of examining develop-
ments relevant to the Federal Rules and public law litigation. The 
first period includes the events leading to, and attending, the adop-
tion of the Rules in I 938. The second period encompasses the ini-
tial quarter-century of experience with application of the Rules. 
The third period involves the developments contributing to the rise 
and growth of public law litigation-essentially from the mid- l 960s 
until the mid-1970s. The fourth period includes ·events leading to 
the expansion of public law litigation and the responses to that in-
crease, including the perceived "litigation explosion," by those re-
sponsible for drafting and applying the Rules. 
A. Adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 and a Look at 
Public Law Litigation 
The events preceding and accompanying the promulgation of 
the Federal Rules in 1938 warrant considerable examination.3 Re-
cent research has expanded substantially understanding of these de-
velopments;4 the events have significant implications for what 
happened subsequently. During the early twentieth century, in-
creasing disenchantment with common law and code practice and 
procedure prompted widespread calls for procedural reform.5 Be-
. ginning approximately with Roscoe Pound's 1906 address to the 
American Bar Association (ABA), entitled "The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice,"6 support for 
procedural change gradually grew. It is important to understand, 
however, that numerous advocates were united only by the desire 
for some change. 7 The proponents held quite diverse views on the 
3 For discussion of developments leading to and surrounding adoption of the 
Rules in 1938, I rely most below on Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions 
of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From The Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. I 
(1989); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986); Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
4 Recent valuable work is cited supra note 3. Although it has expanded under-
standing, this does not necessarily mean that the work is consistent. Total reconciliation 
is not attempted here; rather, I provide multiple "accounts" of the history. 
5 For analysis of these developments and those that preceded them, see Bone, 
supra note 3, at 3-114; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1035-48; Subrin, David Dudley Field and 
the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural l'ision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311 
(1988); Subrin, supra note 3, at 914-21, 926-61. 
6 See The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
A.B.A. Rep. 395, 409-13 (1906) [hereinafter A.B.A. Rep.]. This is a rough approxima-
tion of time; Professor Pound's address was not the sole cause of what happened. For 
more discussion of the developments, see sources cited supra note 5. 
7 Champions ofreform eventually included such disparate luminaries of the Amer-
ican legal community as Pound; William Howard Taft, Chief justice of the United States 
Supreme Court; Thomas Shelton, a Virginia business lawyer who was the first head of 
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forms that such reform might take, and these perspectives ranged 
across a broad spectrum: 
Ironically, many strands of the ideology of conservatives who 
initially sponsored the [statute authorizing adoption of the Rules] 
coalesced with the ideas of liberals who later participated in its 
enactment and implementation. This is most notably true with 
respect to expanding judicial power, trusting experts, their lack of 
faith injuries, and their overall attraction to equity practice.8 
Thus, a reform having conservative political origins came to 
fruition as "New Deal, liberal legislation"9 when Congress passed 
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.10 That statute authorized the 
Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of procedure (subject to Con-
gressional disapproval) governing resolution of civil litigation in the 
federal district courts. 11 In 1935, tQ.e Court appointed the Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), whose Re-
porter was Charles Clark, and which included four additional faculty 
members from elite law schools as well as nine attorneys, nearly all 
of whom practiced in large private law firms and were active in the 
ABA or the American Law Institute. 12 The Advisory Committee be-
gan drafting the Rules that year and submitted its proposals in 193 7 
to the Supreme Court. 13 The Court, minimally changing. the Com-
mittee's work, transmitted the Rules as modified in December to the 
Attorney General, who tendered them in January 1938 to Congress, 
and the proposals became effective "by congressional inaction" that 
September. 14 
In formulating the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee ap-
parently had certain objectives for the Rules as a general set of liti-
gating principles and with respect to some specific procedural areas 
the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure; and Charles Clark, Dean of the 
Yale Law School. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 944-73 (analysis of the growing support for 
reform and the role that each person played). Cf. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1045-98 
(analysis of background developments). 
8 Subrin, supra note 3, at 969 (citations omitted). 
9 Id. at 944. 
hJ See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 amendment). Cf. Burbank, supra note 3, at 
1045-98 (exhaustive analysis of events leading to passage). 
11 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1098-1184 (reinterpreting the statute in light ofpre-
1934 history). 
12 For analysis of Clark, and other members of the Advisory Committee, as well as 
their viewpoints, see Resnik, supra note 3, at 498-507; Subrin, supra note 3, at 961-82. 
See also Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986) (for more discussion of Clark's views); Smith.judge Charles E. 
Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE LJ. 914 (1976) (same). 
13 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 498-515 (analyzing the Committee's work on the pro-
posals); Subrin supra note 3, at 961-83 (same). See also Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power 
of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975) (analysis of the 
Committee's work from 1938 until 1975). 
14 Subrin, supra note 3, at 973. See also Resnik, supra note 3, at 494 n. l. 
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and Rules. 15 These objectives are complex, subtle, and potentially 
inconsistent-and each procedural field and Rule had its own dis-
crete history. 16 Nevertheless, it is possible to explore considera-
tions most relevant to later developments, while suggesting a 
number of plausible accounts of the Advisory Committee's efforts. 17 
The Committee intended the Rules as a whole to provide a 
"trans-substantive code of procedure . . . procedµre generalized 
across substantive lines .... " 18 It also meant the Rules to elevate 
substance over form or, in Charles Clark's own words, for proce-
dure to become the "Handmaid of Justice." 19 Numerous proce-
dural areas and Rules, such as the pleading requirements, embodied 
what has been "labelled the 'liberal ethos,' in which the preferred 
disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure 
through discovery. "20 
The goals of simplicity and non-technical approaches to proce-
dure resemble the idea of the "liberal ethos." The Advisory Com-
mittee's attempt to circumscribe the number of steps in ~ lawsuit 
and the provision for open-ended discovery exemplify these objec-
tives. 21 The concept of uniformity among federal district courts, be.:. 
tween federal and state courts, and among the states represents a 
variation on the idea of simplicity.22 Implicit in these three kinds of 
15 I examine principally below the Rules as a set of litigating principles, supple-
menting that with analyses of specific procedural areas or Rules when warranted for 
purposes of clarifying concepts to be addressed in this Article. There are restrictions on 
this endeavor. It relies on secondary, published commentary and certain Rules. There 
are also limits to historical inquiry, such as attempting to divine the "intent" of fourteen 
drafters working 50 years ago, each of whom might have had his own agenda. See Res-
nik, supra note 3, at 498-99, 508. 
16 All of these objectives cannot even be identified. Full analysis of the objectives 
that would be a mammoth task which is beyond the scope of this Article and fortunately 
unnecessary. For helpful suggestions as to specific Rules and their discrete histories, see 
Subrin, supra note 3, at 923. 
I 7 The accounts are overlapping, intertwined, and not totally compatible. I men-
tion some inconsistencies below and attempt to reconcile others. 
18 Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 
718 (1975). Accord Resnik, supra note 3, at 512; Subrin, supra note 3, at 944. 
19 See C. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965); accord Moore, The 
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 61.C.C. PRAcr.J. 41, 42 (1938); Subrin, supra note 3, 
at 944. 
20 Marcus, supra note 12, at 439. 
21 See Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1649-50 
(1981) (lawsuit's steps); Resnik, supra note 3, at 500-01 (open-ended discovery); Subrin, 
supra note 3, at 977-78 (same). For instance, a lawyer who had filed a pleading with any 
"good ground to support it [could] pretty much discover to his or her heart's content." 
Subrin, supra, at 1650. This would permit "all available data [to] be laid before the 
tribunal trying the case in order to enable it to do justice." Holtzhoff, The Origins and 
Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1057, 1060 (1955). The 
pleading regime also reflected simple, non-technical approaches, see Marcus, supra note 
12, at 439-40. 
22 See $ubrin, supra note 21, at 1650. 
1989] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 275 
uniformity was another: a single set of Rules to govern all cases, 
meaning that law and equity would be merged. Indeed, Professor 
Subrin has convincingly argued that the "underlying philosophy of, 
and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost 
universally drawn from equity rather than common law" and that 
the "Federal Rules went beyond equity's flexibility and permissive-
ness in pleading, joinder, and discovery."23 
Professor Resnik has stated that contemporaneous commentary 
suggests that the drafters acted on a series of assumptions about the 
composition of the federal court caseload, the possibilities of pro-
fessionalism, and the scope of the judicial role. 24 She has observed 
that the private damage suit litigated by private attorneys apparently 
served as an important paradigm for which the Committee drafted 
the Rules.25 According to this view, litigation involves private par-
ties possessing equivalent resources who, with their lawyers, main-
tain considerable control over the litigation. 26 As to the respective 
responsibilities and roles of attorneys and judges, the Advisory 
Committee seemed to have had abiding faith in the efficacy of adju-
dicatory procedures and to have relied on the concept of lawyer-
based adversarialism.27 The drafters apparently trnsted attorney 
self-regulation, especially during pretrial discovery, and endorsed 
23 Subrin, supra note 3, at 922 (citations omitted). Cf Clark & Moore, A New Federal 
Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE LJ. 387, 415-35 (1935) (contemporaneous 
championing of single set of Rules governing law and equity). "The result is played out 
in the Federal Rules in a number of different but interrelated ways: ease of pleading; 
broad joinder; expansive discovery; greater judicial power and discretion; flexible reme-
dies; latitude for lawyers; control over juries; reliance on professional experts; reliance 
on documentation; and disengagement of substance, procedure, and remedy." Subrin, 
supra, at 923-24 (citations omitted). That research also suggests that a procedural sys-
tem dominated by equity is a mixed blessing. Although equity facilitates the creation of 
new rights, it fails to afford efficacious means to vindicate them while contributing to 
numerous pressing problems in American civil procedure. See id. at 925-26, 1000-02. 
24 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 508. 
25 "[O]ne of the prototypical lawsuits for which the 1938 Federal Rules were 
designed was the relatively simple diversity case: a dispute between private individuals 
or businesses in which tortious injury or breach of contract was claimed, private attor-
neys were hired to represent the parties, and monetary damages were sought." Id. But 
see Subrin, supra note 3, at 973 n.375 (Professor Resnik "severely undervalues" equity's 
dominance). 
26 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 508-15. Cf In re Sanjuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire 
Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1010 (lst Cir. 1988) (parties and counsel set own agenda in 
pretrial phase). The private two-party model failed to depict accurately certain statistical 
realities of that time, because the "United States was a party in a substantial percentage 
of the cases" on the civil docket in the federal courts. Resnik, supra, at 509. Even if the 
drafters were aware of this data, they may have discounted the information. Much gov-
ernment litigation involved liquor which declined dramatically with prohibition's repeal 
and relatively low visibility matters, such as enforcement of the internal revenue laws. 
See id. at 508-11. 
27 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 508-15. 
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increased judicial control, particularly vis-a-vis juries. 28 
The history of the Rules does not reveal whether the Advisory 
Committee specifically anticipated or intentionally provided for 
public law litigation in exactly those forms it now assumes. 
Although certain aspects of that history are unclear, the inquiry 
should be pursued, because it will shed important light on later de-
velopments. In the teens, the three most important forerunners of 
modern public interest litigants were litigating cases:29 legal aid so-
cieties established in cities to assist the poor, the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).30 By the late 1920s, 
Charles Clark observed that greater emphasis was being "placed 
upon the effect of legal rules as instruments of social control of 
much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes 
between individual litigants."31 After conducting a 1934 study of 
civil litigation in the federal courts, Clark stated that "to a large ex-
tent [those] courts may be considered as the courts for adjudicating 
various claims involving the central government. This tendency is 
certain to increase with all the new and various forms of federal leg-
islation recently passed."32 
It is important to remember, however, that the individual legal 
aid offices, the NAACP, and the ACLU had relatively few resources 
and consequently engaged in more limited activities than they 
would after 1965.33 Moreover, the 1930s were the time before 
28 See id. at 512-15; 21 c. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: EVIDENCE§ 5025, at 147-51 (1977) (increased judicial control); Subrin, supra note 
21, at 1650 (attorney self-regulation during discovery); Subrin, supra note 3, at 968-73 
(increased judicial control). 
29 Modem public interest litigants include entities, sucb as the Sierra Club and the 
Health Research Group, which vindicate important social values that affect large num-
bers of people. 
30 See N. ARON, supra note l, at 6-23; COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANC-
ING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 21-57 (1976) [hereinafter BALANCING THE SCALES]; Rabin, 
Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209-24 
(1976). 
31 Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, l MISS. LJ. 324, 324 ( 1929). 
32 C. CLARK, REPORT ON CIVIL CASES OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-4 
(1934). Indeed, Roscoe Pound, as early as his 1906 speech to the ABA, alluded, albeit 
obliquely, to the possibility of litigation resembling public law suits, in areas such as 
utility rate setting and workers' employment conditions. See A.B.A. Rep., supra note 6. 
Professor Chayes suggests that the Advisory Committee intentionally crafted the Rules 
to provide for public law suits. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2. Cf Subrin, 
supra note 3, at 961-73 (suggesting that for Clark one virtue of equity-based procedure 
was its ability to accommodate these cases). 
33 See Rabin, supra note 30, at 214-18. Legal aid societies concentrated their efforts 
on the "day-to-day problems of the poor.'' Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE LJ. 
1415, 1440 (1984). Because the NAACP and the ACLU focused on "test cases" to con-
serve scarce resources, they litigated relatively few cases and even that litigation differed 
in certain respects from modem public law litigation. Moreover, labor unions were 
1989] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 277 
many New Deal statutes were actually implemented, before federal 
power became highly centralized, before civil rights litigants were 
active, before federal courts evinced hospitality to rights seekers, 
before widespread judicial review of federal administrative agency 
action, before the 1966 "liberalization" of the class action rule, and 
before the "due process" revolution.34 In short, the Advisory Com-
mittee apparently did not clearly foresee or consciously provide for 
public law litigation in the precise forms in which it exists today. 
This does not necessarily mean. that the drafters' work was irrele-
vant. Indeed, in light of the Committee's identifiable objectives, the 
drafters' efforts probably were compatible with, accommodated, and 
even facilitated the public law litigation that arose. 35 
B. The Federal Rules During the First Quarter-Century 
The Federal Rules generally worked well and enjoyed a cordial 
reception for the first twenty-five years after their adoption in 
1938. 36 The federal courts successfully applied the Rules, especially 
to the private damage suits that comprised a significant percentage 
of the federal docket. 37 The total number of amendments to the 
Rules was relatively small. Most of these were "clarifying" amend-
ments; numerous others essentially honored the objectives of those 
who drafted the original Rules.38 Many states implemented sets of 
Rules modeled after the Federal Rules, while nearly all of the other 
jurisdictions premised particular Rules on the Federal analogues.39 
Clark undoubtedly was responsible for some of the perceived 
practicing a form of group litigation, but it may have been more in the nature of private 
litigation, in the sense that many workers primarily pursued their own economic 
interests. 
34 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 512. 
35 Professor Burbank reached a similar conclusion after surveying most of the views 
mentioned above. See Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 
1463, 1468 (1987). Cf. Resnik, supra note 3, at 512 n.18 (reaching similar conclusion). 
36 See, e.g., 4 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
§ 1008 (2d ed. 1987); Resnik, supra note 3, at 515-17; Subrin,supra note 3, at 910. In the 
following analysis, I rely most on Marcus, supra note 12, and Resnik, supra, and on the 
primary sources on which they rely. 
37 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 515-17. Numerous federal judges warmly praised the 
Rules' effectiveness. See Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 
435, 445 (1958). 
38 See Clark, supra note 37, at 445; Clark, Clarifying Amendments to the Federal Rules, 14 
OHIO ST. LJ. 241 (1953) (clarifying amendments); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural 
Rules on Federal jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976) (few amendments); 
Resnik, supra note 3, at 513 (commentary on 1947 debate over Advisory Committee 
proposal on work product animated by same assumptions as the original Committee 
that proposed Rules). 
39 See Clark, supra note 37, at 435; Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation (Book Review), 87 
YALE LJ. 1284, 1287 (1978); Subrin, supra note 3, at 910. Cf. R. COVER, 0. Fiss &J. 
RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1788 (1988) (discussing changes in rulemaking process instituted 
under Chief Justice Warren). 
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initial success of the Rules. He served as Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee until 1956 and was a member of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit from I 939 until I 959, serving as 
Chief Judge for his last five years.4° Clark's writing, his service as 
Reporter, and his membership on an influential court gave him nu-
merous opportunities to influence implementation of the Rules and 
to champion certain visions of them.41 Clark was ~ot alone, how-
ever. The Rules received considerable praise from the bench and 
the bar42 and from numerous writers who appreciated the Rules' 
benefits and subscribed to the regime they instituted.43 
There were, of course, some problems with implementation of 
the Rules during this period. The liberal pleading system and stra-
tegic exploitation of the Rules were especially problematic in com-
plex or protracted litigation.44 Courts and commentators found 
that there were difficulties attributable to the character of discovery, 
such as overly broad inquiries and judicial reluctance to enforce cer-
tain requirements rigorously.45 Furthermore, some Rules which 
have become important to public law litigation, such as Rule I I gov-
erning sanctions and Rule 68 pertaining to offers of judgment, fell 
into disuse, while others, like Rules I9, 23, and 24 relating to party 
joinder, were read narrowly.4 6 
The antecedents of many of today's public interest litigants 
gradually grew from the time the Rules became effective.47 Only in 
40 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 433 n.3. 
41 For example, Clark successfully suppressed a "guerrilla attack" on the 1938 
Rules' liberal pleading regime. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445; Subrin, supra note 3, at 
983. Even in 1963, Clark was able to assert that "[n]o criticism of major character now 
appears." Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
Soc'v 250, 254 (1963). Cf Smith, supra note 12, at 954-55 (Clark applied the Rules 
flexibly, pragmatically, and sensitively, not always implementing his prior views or those 
of the Committee). 
42 See Clark, supra note 37, at 435, 443. Numerous examples are in the articles in 
the symposium The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 435 
(1958). 
43 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 516; sources cited in note 42 supra. 
44 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 12, at 441; Resnik, supra note 3, at 516 n.89; Subrin, 
supra note 3, at 982-84 and sources cited therein. 
45 See, e.g., New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 
203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. 
L. REv. 480 (1958). Cf Jn re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 
1007, 1010-11 (lst Cir. 1988) (party/counsel control of pretrial phase generally thought 
sufficient after initial rules' adoption but problems with pretrial discovery and complex 
litigation soon became clear). 
46 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 591 (1967-68) (party joinder 
Rules read narrowly); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" 
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. I, 35 (1976) (Rule II 
disuse); infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (Rule 68 disuse). 
47 Approximately 80 percent of American cities with more than 100,000 residents 
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the 1960s, however, did these entities begin to secure the requisite 
resources to support substantial expansion of their operations and 
to plan extensively for the type of suits now considered public law 
litigation.48 Many developments that led to the rise of modem pub-
lic law litigation by the mid-l 960s had not occurred or had been 
only faintly perceived. For instance, although Judge Jerome Frank 
coined the term "private attorney general" in 1943,49 and Congress 
passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, 50 significant re-
strictions, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness, impeded those 
who sought to challenge governmental activity in the federal courts 
throughout most of the twenty-five year period.51 At the end of this 
time, Congress, the judiciary, and the Advisory Committee began 
easing these and other limitations on access to the federal courts52 
and began taking other actions conducive to public law litigation.53 
C. The Rise and Growth of Public Law Litigation From the 
mid-1960s Until the mid-1970s 
1. Institutional Refonn Litigation 
Between the mid- l 960s and mid- l 970s, numerous develop-
ments, some of which already have been mentioned, significantly 
changed the nature of considerable federal civil litigation. 54 These 
developments include the rise of "institutional reform" or "struc-
tural" litigation which differs from, and even reverses, many salient 
characteristics of traditional, priva~e, two-party litigation. 55 Because 
had legal aid offices by 1958. See Houck, supra note 33, at 1438. The ACLU broadened 
significantly the scope of its litigation. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 210-14. The NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund "ran a string of successes through Brown v. Board of 
Education in 1954." See Houck, supra, at 1441. 
48 See Houck, supra note 33, at 1439-41; Rabin, supra note 30, at 212, 216-17. Cor-
respondingly, very few of the kind of public interest litigants in substantive areas, such 
as environmental protection, which these entities prefigured, had organized or were ac-
tively involved in federal civil litigation. See Houck, supra, at 1442-43; Rabin, supra, at 
224-27. 
49 See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 
U.S. 707 (1943); cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) 
(endorsing similar concept but not expressly using term). 
50 Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
51 These developments are analyzed in Professor Jalfe's 1965 classic,Jumc1AL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. For additional discussion, especially of standing and 
challenges to agency dccisionmaking, see Stewart, The Refon11atio11 of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76, 1711-60 (1975); Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privitization of Public Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1436-38 (1988). 
52 See infra notes 83-88, 94-99, 103 and accompanying text. 
53 These actions include, for instance, Congressional passage of civil rights and 
consumer protection legislation, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
54 See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6 (concise discussion of these develop-
ments); Resnik, supra note 3, at 512 (same). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supm 
note 2 (more thorough discussion). 
55 1 rely most here on recent, relevant cases, Cha yes, Public I.aw Litigation, supra note 
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this kind of public law litigation departs so substantially from the 
traditional model, 56 and because some have questioned the legiti-
macy and advisability of institutional litigation,57 the litigation de-
serves thorough examination. 
Institutional reform litigation has "sprawling and amorphous" 
party structure. 58 Plaintiffs typically pursue relief that could affect 
numerous people not before the court as well as institutional, polit-
ical, and economic structures. 59 Individuals frequently attempt to 
litigate their cases as class actions, a development arguably facili-
tated by the liberalizing 1966 amendment to Rule 23.60 Defendants 
generally are large bureaucratic institutions or agencies of the fed-
eral, state, or local government, such as prisons or schools. 61 The 
subject matter of these lawsuits usually is the policy, practice, opera-
tion, or decisionmaking of those entities-in essence, a dispute over 
the conduct or content of public policy. 62 Challenges typically al-
lege violation of a right63 and urge the judiciary to enunciate and 
enforce public policies and values derived from governing constitu-
tional or statutory law.64 Plaintiffs often seek non-monetary, "pro-
2, the seminal work on such litigation, and the work of Professor Fiss, who has produced 
the clearest, most extensive work on such litigation. See, e.g., R. COVER, 0. Fiss & ]. 
RESNICK, supra note 39; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. I 073 ( 1984) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Against Settlement]; Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAw & HUM. 
BEHAV. 121 (1982); Fiss, supra note 2. 
56 The illegitimacy of this departure is one important contention of those who criti-
cize the litigation. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 264. Even its most ardent 
advocates, such as Professors Chayes and Fiss, admit that the litigation "reverses" cru-
cial characteristics of traditional concepts of adjudication. See Cha yes, Public Law Litiga-
tion, supra note 2, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 31. 
57 For a representative sample of the literature, see the sources cited supra note 2. 
Cf Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) (representative judicial 
exposition). 
58 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302. Accord Fiss, supra note 2, at 18-
24. For case examples, see Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310, 1311, 1315-17 (6th Cir. 
1989); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. II, 12-13 (E.D. Tex. 1982). 
59 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); Duran, 760 F.2d at 
759. See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 18-
22, 27-28; Fletcher, supra note 2, at 635-41. 
60 See, e.g., Hodge v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 862 F.2d 859, 860 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Lelsz, 98 F.R.D. at 12-13. See also Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6. 
61 See, e.g., Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 344 (state prison system); Geier, 871 F.2d at 1311 
(state higher education system). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 
1302; Fallon, supra note 2, at I n.l; Fiss, supra note 2, at 1-3, 18. Of course, there are 
exceptions. For example, the institution may be a private entity, like a corporation. 
62 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(police lieutenants' examination); Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1540-42 (9th Cir. 
1988) (government decision). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302; 
Fiss, supra note 2, at 4, 9-10, 27-28. 
63 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at 9-10 (right); Fallon, supra note 2, at 3-4 (iajury to 
interests). 
64 See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (civil rights plain-
tiffs vindicate civil and constitutional rights); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 863 (5th 
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spective injunctive relief to prevent continued wrongdoing. " 65 
These remedies frequently affect many persons and entities not in-
volved in the suit, require ongoing judicial participation, and are 
meant to reform the offending institution.66 
The remedial stage of institutional reform litigation, therefore, 
is especially likely to differ significantly from private law litigation. 67 
Courts must assemble predictive and legislative facts to formulate, 
implement, and monitor complex affirmative decrees governing 
large bureaucracies. 68 Performance of these tasks frequently re-
quires novel sources of evidence, new mechanisms, and experimen-
tal processes. 69 The remedial phase may well evolve into a "long 
continuous relationship between the judge and the institution," last-
ing years after the entry of the initial decree. 10 
Judges generally play different, and frequently more active, 
roles in institutional reform litigation. Courts often assume greater 
responsibility for fact-gathering and analysis and for "determining 
Cir. 1987) (Hill, R.M., J., concurring) (courts protect constitutional and statutory 
rights). See also Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 2, 58; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1-5. 
65 Fallon, supra note 2, at 1 n.l. See, e.g., Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574 (civil rights plain-
tiffs vindicate rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms). Accord Chayes, 
Public lAw Litigation, supra note 2, at 1292-96. 
66 See, e.g., Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 344, Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863. CJ Dan-Cohen, Bureau-
cratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. l, 2 (1985) (litigation's 
"main point is to shape the form of future transactions and interactions"). See also Fal-
lon, supra note 2, at 4-5; Fiss, supra note 2, at 2-3, 27-28, 36. 
67 See, e.g., Chayes, Public lAw Litigation, supra note 2, at 1298-1302; Fiss, supra note 
2, at 27-28. The liability stage differs less, although it requires more than a "pronounce-
ment of the legal consequences of past events [and] to some extent a prediction of what 
is likely to be in the future." See Chayes, supra, at 1294. For a recent case that affords a 
sense of the remedial stage in such litigation and of how it differs from the liability phase 
as well as the complex, shifting party alignments in the litigation, see Geier, 871 F.2d at 
1311, 1315-17. 
68 See, e.g., Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863. See also Chayes, Public lAw Litigation, supra note 2, 
at 1296-98, 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
69 Courts may consult informational sources other than the parties, such as parents 
of children who are residents in state institutions for persons considered mentally re-
tarded. See, e.g., Lelsz, 98 F.R.D. 11. See also Fiss, supra note 2, at 25-26. Courts may 
employ adjuncts to judges, like special masters, to collect and analyze the requisite data 
or to promote the negotiation of decrees among litigants. See, e.g., Gnibbs, 870 F.2d at 
344. See also Berger, Away from the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special 
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978): Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the 
judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 394 (1986); Fiss, supra, at 26-27. 
For other mechanisms, see Chayes, Public lAw Litigation. supra note 2, at 1300-01. Courts 
also may apply procedures not ordinarily associated with adjudication, such as forms of 
"Alternative Dispute Resolution." See Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 424 (1986). For analysis of this procedure 
and other new processes, see McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Com-
plex Litigation, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 440 (1986). 
70 Fiss, supra note 2, at 27. Accord Chayes, Public lAw Litigation, supra note 2, at 1301-
02. For examples of litigation now in its twenty-first year, see Geier, 871 F.2d at 1311; 
Hodge, 862 F.2d at 860. 
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the interests, shaping the issues, and designing the remedies in-
volved in litigation."71 Some judges and writers have stated that the 
courts may take into account all of the interests influenced by their 
decisionmaking, may consider policy arguments in addition to con-
tentions premised on existing rights, and may accord diminished 
significance to precedent. 72 Courts are said to perform an "over-
sight function on behalf of the interests and groups as well as the 
individuals affected by the challenged bureaucratic _actions, " 73 while 
the judge purportedly is a public officer "empowered by the polit-
ical agencies to enforce and create society-wide norms, and perhaps 
even restructure institutions, as a way ... of giving meaning to our 
public values. " 74 
2. Public Interest Litigation 
"Public interest" litigation resembles, but differs from, institu-
tional reform litigation in certain respects. 75 Public interest litiga-
tion vindicates the ideological, political, or moral interests of 
numerous persons in attempting to insure that institutions behave 
lawfully.76 One typical and important-form of this litigation chal-
lenges the decisionmaking of federal administrative agencies. 77 
During the 1960s, numerous observers with different political per-
71 Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 35. Accord Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 
2, at 1296-1302; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1-5. Cf. Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863 (judicial 
articulation). 
72 See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 35; Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 
2, at 1289-1302. 
73 Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 60. The same writer earlier asserted that "in 
actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating between the panies, [and] devel-
oping his own sources of expertise and information, the trial judge has passed beyond 
even the role of the legislator and has become a policy planner and manager." Chayes, 
Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302. 
74 Fiss, supra note 2, at 31. The same writer stated more recently that the judicial 
duties are to "explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such 
as the Constitution ... to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with 
them." Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1095. 
75 "Public interest" litigation is the term that 1 employ; however, it captures con-
cepts drawn principally from the work of Professor Chayes and of the writers in adminis-
trative law listed below. See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2; Chayes, Public Law Litigation, 
supra note 2; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeklian or Ideological 
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Rabin, supra note 30; Stewart, supra note 51. Cf. Roben-
son v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989) (recent example of public 
interest litigation that reached the Supreme Court). 
76 See Jaffe, supra note 75, at 1045-46. Such litigation seeks to "redress iajuries not 
easily definable in terms of personal, financial loss or other harms actionable at common 
law," while plaintiffs do not assen that the "defendant has breached a legal duty running 
personally to them.'' Fallon, supra note 2, at 4. 
77 For example, Methow Valley challenged decisionmaking of the United States For-
est Service. For thorough treatment of the ideas in the remainder of this paragraph see 
Rabin, supra note 75; Stewan, supra note 51. For a concise version, see Tobias, Rule 19 
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spectives increasingly criticized the agencies. They claimed that 
agencies were "captured" by the very interests they were supposed 
to regulate, that agencies failed to achieve the goals for which they 
were established, and that agencies were ineffective or unrespon-
sive. 78 Many courts, writers, and critics came to perceive considera-
ble agency decisionmaking as an essentially legislative process in 
which the perspectives of all affected individuals and interests were 
evaluated in making a decision.79 That understanding was rendered 
problematic, however, because the interests of many persons and 
entities were not advocated, much less considered.80 Judges re-
sponded by relaxing restrictions on public participation in adminis-
trative processes and courtroom litigation and by rigorously 
analyzing agency decisionmaking.s1 
Finally, the pursuit of important social values is the unifying 
theme of much institutional reform and public interest litigation. 
This litigation can also facilitate realization of significant process 
values, such as those of a participatory and dignitary nature.82 
and the Public Rights Exception To Party]oinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 754-56 (1987). For 
discussion of other forms of public interest litigation, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
78 For a comprehensive catalog of these criticisms, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY Poucy ch. 3 (2d ed. 1985). See also Rabin, supra 
note 75, at 1266-72. 
79 This was an important theme of Professor Stewart's seminal 1975 article. See 
Stewart, supra note 51, at 1671-83. Cf. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 
475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) Gudicial articulation 
of theme). 
80 See Garland, Deregulation and]udicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 577-81 (1985); 
Rabin, supra note 75, at 1296-99; Stewart, supra note 51, at 1671-88, 1711-59. 
in For examples of cases relaxing those restrictions, see Association of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Office of Communication of the 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000·06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
U.S. 941 (1966). For analysis of case law developments easing the restraints, see Gell-
horn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE LJ. 359, 362-69 (1972); 
Stewart, supra note 51, at 1723-56; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1441-51. For examples of 
cases calling for rigorous judicial analysis of agency decisionmaking, see Home Box Of.. 
fice, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35·36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Airline 
Pilots Ass'n lnt'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 972 (1975). For analysis of case law developments requiring rigorous analysis, 
see Rabin, supra note 75, at 1300-15; Stewart, supra, at 1756·60, 1781-89. The lower 
federal courts even created a private attorney general exception to the American Rule, 
thus permitting attorneys' fees to be shifted from defendants to plaintiffs in public law 
cases. The Supreme Court, however, halted this development in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Congress responded to that determina· 
tion by passing the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 (1982). 
82 Most of the early literature on process values is excerpted in R. COVER & 0. Fiss, 
THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979). Cf. Burbank, supra note 35, at 1466·71 (catalog 
oflater work). 
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3. judicial Activity 
Judicial recognition and expansion of substantive rights not 
previously acknowledged or extended so broadly were related to the 
rise and growth of the two types of public law litigation. 83 The 
United States Supreme Court ruled, for instance, that there was a 
right of privacy that invalidated proscriptions on contraceptives84 
and on abortions,85 while it read the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause to require school desegregation86 and re-
apportionment. 87 Correspondingly, the federal judiciary's height-
ened sensitivity to due process concerns "generated a myriad of 
cases involving a kaleidoscopic range of matters that were not within 
the standard litigation repertoire [before]-dress and hair codes, ac-
ademic and government employment status, prisoners' rights, and 
welfare benefits .... "88 
4. Congressional Activity 
Considerable federal legislation implicated most of these devel-
opments. 89 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Congress enacted 
many statutes that some characterized as "social legislation" or 
"regulation."9° Certain measures proscribed discrimination in edu-
cation, employment, and housing.91 Additional statutes provided 
83 In this paragraph, I rely most on Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 
69 MINN. L. REV. I (1984); Resnik, supra note 3; and relevant cases. Of course, judicial 
recognition and expansion of"procedural'' rights also contributed to the litigation's rise 
and growth. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
84 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
85 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989) (characterizing women's right to abortion as a "lib-
erty interest protected by the Due Process clause"). 
86 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
87 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
88 See Miller, supra note 83, at 6. This sensitivity reflected a revolution in thinking 
about entitlements and private rights typified by cases, such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970), and writing, like Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). In-
deed, the Supreme Court, in deciding important cases involving civil, administrative, 
and criminal procedure in the 1960s and early 1970s, evinced a view of adjudication that 
comported with important objectives embodied in the original Rules, such as lawyer-
based adversarialism. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 516. 
89 For thorough treatment of the legislative activity, see Rabin, supra note 75, at 
1278-95. For more concise treatment, see Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6; Miller, 
supra note 83, at 5. 
90 For discussions of "social legislation," see Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 
155 (T. McGraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation," 47 Pus. INTEREST 
49 (Spring 1977). Cf R. LITAN & w. NoROHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 44 
(1983) (observing that 40 major statutes were enacted). 
9l See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-el7 
(1982). 
1989] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 285 
for environmental preservation and pollution control92 and sought 
to protect consumers from unsafe products and from unfair com-
mercial practices.93 A number of enactments encouraged suit by 
their intended beneficiaries, such as those individuals or groups 
subjected to discrimination. Many measures liberally granted stand-
ing or authorized "citizen suits,"94 while others provided for awards 
of attorneys' fees.95 Moreover, much legislation mandated or in-
vited affirmative judicial enforcement. 96 ln fact, the Civil Rights Act 
of 196497 and the Voting Rights Act of 196598 were responsible for 
the twenty-five fold increase in the number of civil rights filings be-
tween 1960 and 1972.99 
5. The Rules 
The role of the Rules in the rise and expansion of public law 
litigation between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s is unclear. For 
most of this decade, the Rules continued to enjoy good, albeit less 
glowing, press and continued to function reasonably well. 100 There 
were comparatively few amendments to the Rules; a small number 
was substantive and most embodied the objectives of the 1938 draft-
ers.101 For example, even the "significant" 1970 amendments to 
the discovery provisions left the image of attorney control and coop-
eration essentially intact. 102 Certain changes made the Rules more 
flexible and permissive than before. Although the 1966 amend-
ments governing compulsory party joinder, class actions, and inter-
vention clearly liberalized these Rules, their importance to public 
92 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-34 
(1982). 
93 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
94 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1983); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 (1986). 
95 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of Brennan,]., 
dissenting) (comprehensive compendium of fee-shifting legislation). Cf. Tobias, Of Pub-
lic Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public 
Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982) (agency payment to 
public for costs incurred when participating in administrative proceedings). 
96 See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6; Fallon, supra note 2, at 3. 
97 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982)). 
98 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-l 
(1982)). 
99 See Miller, supra note 83, at 5 (citation omitted). 
100 See Cover, supra note 18, at 718; Hazard, supra note 39, at 1287; Resnik, supra 
note 3, at 515-16. The two major treatises in the civil procedure field, those of Professor 
Moore and of Professors Wright and Miller, maintained before the bench and bar a 
"vision of the Federal Rules as a coherent structure" while embracing the "flexibility of 
application" that permitted the Rules to serve numerous purposes. See Cover, supra, at 
718. 
101 See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 397 n.2 (few amendments). 
102 See Miller, supra note 83, at 14-15. 
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law litigation may have been overstated.103 
Some observers recognized that there were difficulties with the 
Rules as written and applied. Most of the problems in application 
witnessed during the first quarter-century intensified in the mid-
1970s. 104 New difficulties, such as excesses in attorney use, and ju-
dicial implementation, of the class action device, also arose. 105 The 
greater number and complexity of civil suits caused mounting con-
cern.106 Moreover, certain perceived benefits of the Rules came to 
be seen as disadvantages, perhaps reflecting broadening disenchant-
ment with some choices of the original drafters. 107 
It now appears most accurate that the Rules in conjunction with 
the developments examined above108 afforded a congenial environ-
ment in which public law litigation could flourish. 109 The Rules and 
those developments apparently reflect a transformation in the con-
ceptualization of certain litigation and many of its components, in-
cluding the interest needed to initiate and impose liability in a 
lawsuit, the subject matter of a lawsuit, and the party structure, as 
well as the relief afforded and the role of judges in resolving dis-
putes.110 To be sure, the liberal ethos pervading the Rules as a 
whole and the liberality and flexibility that equity fostered in specific 
103 For numerous examples of overstatement in the class action context, see Miller, 
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem, "92 
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). Cf Burbank, supra note 35, at 1479 ("the 1966 amendments 
made the triumph [of equity] complete"). 
104 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. This was especially true of discov-
ery. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); 
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discover;•: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978). 
I 05 See Miller, supra note 103, at 676-79 (describing these excesses). 
106 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 440-44 (discussing pressures of managing litigation 
and increasing focus on discovery); Miller, supra note 83, at 2-3, 14-15 (discussing the 
litigation explosion and the need to control the pretrial process); Resnik, supra note 3, at 
520-21, 524-26 (relevant data). 
I 07 This was true of the liberal pleading regime and attorney control over the pre-
trial process. See Miller, supra note 83, at 8-9, 14-15; Resnik, supra note 3, at 520-25. 
108 See supra notes 54-99 and accompanying text. 
109 This is not to say that public law litigation was predominant even at its apogee. 
This issue remains controversial, however, and its resolution depends substantially on 
how one defines such litigation. Compare Burbank, supra note 35, at 1468 (suggesting 
phenomenon never the norm) with Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1087 (sug-
gesting predominant form of litigation today). For more discussion, relevant data, and 
some attempts at resolution, see infra notes 154-59, 164 & 415 and accompanying text. 
110 For instance, when a dispute over public policy is considered the subject matter 
of litigation, or a moral interest is considered adequate to intervene in a case, those 
concepts are much different than subject matter and interest as traditionally understood 
in private law suits. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 
1989) (police lieutenants' examination subject matter and confident expectation of 
promotion to rank of lieutenant sufficient interest). Cf supra notes 58-76 and accompa-
nying text; infra text accompanying note 402 (more discussion of transformed 
conceptualizations). 
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Rules enabled public interest litigants to institute suit, successfully 
resist preliminary motions, conduct broad discovery, and reach the 
merits of their claims. Moreover, equity underlies numerous proce-
dural measures employed in public law litigation, particularly when 
judges fashion a remedy in institutional litigation. 11 1 Equity also 
"emphasized joining all relevant parties and issues, amassing all rel-
evant data, and permitting the chancellor, with a good deal of dis-
cretion, to order what was fair andjust." 112 On balance, it was the 
Rules, together with the developments enumerated, that made pos-
sible the rise and growth of public law litigation from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1970s. 
D. Public Law Litigation and the Rules Since the Mid-1970s 
Numerous complex and occasionally inconsistent developments 
relevant to public law litigation and to the Rules have occurred since 
the mid-1970s. 113 The recent nature of these developments makes 
it difficult to secure sufficient perspective to afford a definitive ac-
count. It is possible, however, to describe the developments most 
important to public law litigation and to the Rules. 
First, many perceive that the federal courts are experiencing a 
"litigation explosion."114 Important to this perception is the belief 
that litigants and lawyers overuse, misuse, and abuse the civil justice 
system.us Federal courts purportedly receive an overwhelming 
l 1 1 See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1292-96, 1303; see supra notes 67-
70 and accompanying text. · 
112 Subrin, supra note 3, at 968. 
1_13 In this subsection, 1 rely substantially on secondary accounts, especially Marcus, 
supra note 12; Miller, supra note 83; and Resnik, supra note 3; and on judicial opinions 
that help to illustrate relevant concepts. 
114 Some observe crises in the adversarial and civil justice systems. These are 
closely related, if not identical, to the "litigation explosion" which is the term used here 
to describe the phenomena. For concise descriptions which include similar litanies of 
the problems, see Marcus, supra note 12, at 440-44; Resnik, supra note 3, at 494-95; 
Subrin, supra note 3, at 910-12. The litigation explosion theme was first articulated 
clearly and comprehensively in several Supreme Court opinions of the mid-1970s and at 
the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istration of justice (The Pound Conference). See National Hockey League v. Metropoli-
tan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ONjUSTICE IN THE 
FUTURE (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979) [hereinafter THE PouND CONFERENCE]. It has 
been elaborated throughout the ensuing period and retains considerable persuasiveness 
today. For references to the copious commentary, see the sources cited in Marcus, supra, 
at 440-44; Resnik, supra, at 510-12. Professor Resnik traces Supreme Court pronounce-
ments throughout the period. For a recent example, see W. REHNQ.UIST, 1988 YEAR END 
REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE (1988). Cf. H. REP. No. R. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 
23-24, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 5982, 5983-84 (discussion of 
Congressional interest in, and action relating to, litigation explosion). 
1 15 These were the theses of many of the addresses and much of the commentary in 
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number of civil filings, 116 too many of which are said to lack substan-
tive merit or to exploit available procedural mechanisms like discov-
ery for strategic advantage. 117 Of those lawsuits which are more 
legitimate, too great a number allegedly are overly complex, involv-
ing numerous parties, claims, and issues, and requiring months and 
years of pretrial activity. 118 These and other factors 119 are taken to 
cause unwarranted delay and cost, often perverting, and inhibiting 
participation in, the civil justice system. 12° · 
Despite widespread agreement that the number of civil filings 
has increased significantly, that a greater percentage of these suits 
are complex, and that complicated cases are more difficult to re-
solve, 12 1 many draw differing inferences from this information. 
These opinions range from dire predictions about the death of the 
civil justice system as it has existed 122 to optimistic observations that 
increased filings indicate satisfaction with the federal courts. 123 
Writers have debated the nature as well as the implications of the 
"explosion." Some have disputed the size and duration of the cur-
rent "explosion" 12 4 and whether "real litigation rates have in-
THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 114. A typical example is Burger, Agenda/or 2000 
A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in id. at 23. 
116 See Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987) 
(helpful data); Miller, supra note 83, at 2-3 (helpful data); Resnik, supra note 3, at 525 
n.138 (same). Cf Chief judge Motley Describes Court, Career; Reflects on National Impact of 
Landmark Cases, Third Branch, Dec. 1985, at 1 (example of judicial concern about in-
creasing caseloads). 
117 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); National Hockey League 
v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 74041 (1975); Marcus, supra note 12, at 44143; Rosenberg 
& King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
579. 
118 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 83, at 6-11; Resnik, supra 
note 3, at 521-22, 526. Cf Resnik, supra, at 495 n.6, 521 n.118 (data on time for case 
dispositions). 
119 One helpful, representative, but Jess than exhaustive, litany includes the "explo-
sion in substantive Jaw, photocopying, the types and difficulty of issues brought to 
courts, the increase in amounts of money involved, and 'the sheer number of parties.' " 
Subrin, supra note 3, at 912 (citing R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-7 (1985)). Accord In re Sanjuan 
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1988); Miller, supra 
note 83. 
120 See supra note 117; see also Burger, supra note 115, at 31-32. 
121 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 116 & 118. 
122 This tone appears in numerous addresses and much commentary in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE, supra note 114. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Inten-
tions Gone Awry?, in id. at 211-12; Rifkind, Are We Askiug Too Much of Our Courts?, in id. at 
64. 
123 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 495 n.6. Opinions also exist in the "middle range," 
such as comparatively unconcerned observations that neither dramatic increases in liti-
gation nor civil delay are unprecedented. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 440 n.46 (numer-
ous sources). 
124 See, e.g., M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE vi (1984); Ga-
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creased." 125 Regardless of the reality, the perception that there is 
an explosion has led to considerable judicial, Advisory Committee, 
and Congressional activity important to public law litigation and the 
Rules. 
There is a growing sense that the Rules work less effectively 
than before. 126 The liberality and flexibility of the Rules are said to 
have made possible an increasing civil caseload, more complex and 
time consuming lawsuits, and abuse, manipulation, and exploitation 
of the litigation process.1 27 Recent concerns reflect disenchantment 
with certain objectives, choices, and ideas of the original Advisory 
Committee. In retrospect, the Committee seems to have premised 
its work on overly optimistic appraisals, unrealistic assessments, and 
misplaced trust or naivete. 128 The drafters' decision to leave the 
pretrial process essentially to attorneys illustrates all of these 
difficulties: 
Given the realities of modern large-scale litigation, the 
rulemakers' expectations for a self-executing, cooperative pretrial 
lanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We 
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society. 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 9 (1983); 
Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation; 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 72 (1983). Professors Schwab and Eisenberg recently found national data and re-
search on an important district to suggest that the image ofa civil rights litigation explo-
sion is overstated and borders on myth. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 642-43 (1987). See also Schwab & 
Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorneys Fees Statute 
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988) (later study essentially 
confirms earlier findings). 
125 See, e.g., Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Consciousness in 
Modem America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661, 663 (1980). CJ. Galanter, The Life and Times of the 
Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 942-
46 (business contract litigation contributing substantially to so-called litigation explo-
sion). Moreover, minimal data apparently support the allegations of abuse, especially in 
discovery. See, e.g., Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discover)' Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 812-13 (1981); Miller, supra note 
103, at 667; Resnik, supra note 3, at 523 n.130; Weinstein, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking 
Facts: Brief Rejlectio11S 011 Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST.JOHN'S L. 
REV. 429, 439 (1988). 
126 I rely most in this paragraph on Miller, supra note 83; Resnik, supra note 3; Sub-
rin, supra note 3; and Subrin, supra note 21. 
127 Sri' Marcus, supra note 12, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 83. Cf ACF Indus., Inc. v. 
EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086-88 (1979) (Powell,]., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(increasing discovery abuse). 
128 The drafters' faith that adjudication would lead to truth and that more process 
would yield the best, or at least better, outcomes illustrates their undue optimism. Sep 
Resnik, supra note 3; see also Marcus, supra note 12, at 492; Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650. 
The view that procedure could be divorced totally from substance demonstrates their 
lack of realism. See Subrin, supra, at 1652; Sl'I' also Burbank. supra note 35, at 1470-75. 
The Committee·s unrealized hopes that the Rules' provisions for discovery. pretrial con-
ferences and summary judgment would restrict cases' scope and conclude meritless liti-
gation illustrate misplaced trust. Sep Subrin, supra note 3, at 975-91; see also Miller. supra 
note 83, at 14-15. 
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phase have proven to be somewhat naive. Attorneys have neither 
cooperated voluntarily to move through discovery nor policed 
each other by seeking sanctions for abusive discovery tactics. 129 
The drafters' goals of trans-substantive Rules and of uniformity 
now appear unworkable. 130 The ravages oftime and unforeseen de-
velopments, such as the mobile nature of American society and the 
rise of the modern administrative state, have undermined other 
choices of the Committee. 131 The Advisory Committee failed to dis-
cern certain matters that now seem obvious and was responsible for 
omissions and oversights. The 1938 Rules made minimal provision 
for settlement, the manner in which ninety-five percent of the cases 
filed today are resolved. 132 
Courts, the Advisory Committee, and Congress have responded 
to the litigation explosion and litigation abuse by attempting to dis-
courage filing, to facilitate expeditious resolution of suits, and to 
punish lawyer misconduct. As early as 1975, the Supreme Court 
warned lower federal courts about misuse of the litigation process 
by attorneys with frivolous claims and soon thereafter encouraged 
judges to impose sanctions to deter abuse of discovery. 133 The 
Court has admonished lower courts to exercise "restraint" in resolv-
ing threshold issues, such as standing, 134 and in considering imposi-
tion of relief while evincing such restraint itself in appropriate 
cases. 135 
Since the mid-l 970s, numerous district courts have practiced 
129 Miller, supra note 83, at 15. The example also shows how some choices created 
conflicts-such as that between lawyer obligations to clients to be zealous advocates and 
to courts to insure smooth pretrial processes-and facilitated the subversion of objec-
tives embodied in other choices. 
130 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 54 7-48; Subrin, supra note 3, at 985-91; Subrin, supra 
note 21, at 1650-51. Cf Burbank, supra note 35, at 1474 (many current Rules "authorize 
essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial 
sense"). Similarly, simple non-technical approaches seem insufficiently responsive to 
numerous demands of modem litigation, especially those posed by complex cases. 
131 Cf Resnik, supra note 3, at 502 n.30 (difficulty of anticipating "Calder-like con-
figurations" that pass today as lawsuits). 
132 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 498, 520 n.115. 
133 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). Cf Bur-
ger Says 1'acm1cies Add to judicial Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12, col. I (Chief 
Justice urged more frequent imposition of sanctions in annual report to the judiciary); 
supra note 114 (Congressional response). 
134 For analysis of standing and citations to the relevant cases, see Chayes, Foreword, 
supra note 2, at 8-26; Fallon, supra note 2, at 13-59; Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 68 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1451-61. 
135 See Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (example implicating stand-
ing and relief). For analysis of the admonitions and citations to the relevant cases, see 
Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 45-56; Fallon, supra note 2, at 59-74. Indeed, the Court 
may be manipulating resolution of the threshold questions to avoid reaching remedial 
issues. See Chayes, supra, at 52-56; Fallon, supra, at 5. 
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"managerial judging."136 The courts have assumed more active 
roles in expediting the resolution of cases by employing pretrial 
conferences to set the pace of litigation, to structure issues, or to 
encourage settlement; by imposing restrictions on the scope and 
timing of discovery; and by levying sanctions for attorney abuse of 
the litigation process. 137 Many judges have experimented with Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, while others have created new proce-
dures for complex litigation. 138 Most managerial judging has 
proceeded informally, but some has been conducted pursuant to re-
cently promulgated local Rules. 139 The 1983 amendments to the 
Federal Rules and the second edition of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation formalized nearly all of the managerial practices 
followed. 140 
Although certain 1980 amendments of the Rules were intended 
to limit attorney abuse of the discovery process, 141 the 1983 amend-
ments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 sought to increase the responsibili-
ties of attorneys, to enhance judicial control and management of 
litigation, to- improve discovery, and to require imposition of sane-
136 Valuable early studies includes. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MAN-
AGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977) and Resnik, Managerial judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). Cf. Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 
HAsTINGS LJ. 505 (1984) (providing another view ofmanagerialjudging's efficacy). Cf. 
Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 647, 675-78 
(1988) (recent analysis). 
137 See, e.g. Peckham, The Federal judge as" a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a 
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 70 (1981); Resnik, supra note 136, at 391-
400. 
138 See generally Lieberman & Henry, supra note 69 (analysis of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution); Resnik, supra note 3, at 534-36 (same). For discussion of some of the new 
procedures, see E. LIND &J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN 
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT CouRTS (1983); Resnik, supra, at 527, 534-36; Sander, Varieties 
of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Lambros & Shunk, The Summary jury Trial, 29 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980). 
139 See In re Sanjuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (bench relied on inherent powers to take more active approach to manage-
ment of pending litigation); Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in 
View of Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253 (1979) (managerial 
judging pursuant to local Rules); H.R. REP. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29 
(1988), reprinted in U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 5987-89 (discussion of diffi-
culties local Rules' proliferation has created, ongoing study oflocal Rules, and of efforts 
to reduce conflicts between local and national Rules and to open local rule making 
processes); Coquilette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (Jan. 
1989) (analysis by authors of local Rules study). 
140 See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983), 
and the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second (1985). 
141 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980). 
Three Justices dissented from the order adopting the amendments because of their be-
lief that the alterations would not prevent abuse and that "Congress' acceptance of these 
tinkering changes [would] delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms." 
Id. at 1000. 
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tions when proper. 142 Rule 16 increases the district courts' power 
to manage lawsuits by employing pretrial conferencesl43 and sched-
uling orders 144 and by imposing sanctions for violations of certain 
requirements. 145 Amended Rule 26 ~uthorizes similar changes in 
discovery, empowering judges to restrict discovery in specific cir-
cumstances and to impose mandatory sanctions. 146 Amended Rule 
11 supplements the provisions for managerial judging in Rules 16 
and 26 by requiring compulsory imposition of sanc.tions for failure 
to conduct reasonable pre-filing inquiries and demands greater re-
sponsibility and accountability from attorneys.147 
These developments, especially the 1983 amendments and the 
rise of managerial judging, depart significantly from the objectives 
and choices of the original Advisory Committee, changing and even 
reversing the initial work.148 Certain changes apparently attempt to 
142 See Order, supra note 140. For helpful discussions of the amendments, see A. 
MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOT-
ING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Hali, New Rules 
Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A.J. 1640 (1983). The amendment of Rule 7 merely 
makes motions subject to Rule 11 's requirements and will only be treated in this Article 
in conjunction with Rule 11. 
143 See FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c). Matters appropriate for discussion at such conferences 
include issue formulation, advisability of pleading amendments, avoidance of unneces-
sary proof, and witness and document identification. Particularly important to public 
law litigation are the possibilities of settlement, of employing extra-judicial processes to 
resolve cases, and of using special procedures to manage suits involving "complex is-
sues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions or unusual proof problems." FED. R. C1v. 
P. I6(c)(IO). See also McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 818 (1988). 
144 See FED. R. C1v. P. 16(b). Within 120 days of filing, the judge must issue a sched-
uling order imposing time restraints on party joinder, amendment of pleadings, submis-
sion of motions and completion of hearings and discovery. 
145 See FED. R. C1v. P. 16(£). Sanctions can be imposed upon litigants, attorneys, or 
both for failing to appear at, to be prepared for, or to participate in good faith in, pre-
trial conferences. 
146 See Order, supra note 140; FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l) (judges may limit discovery 
found "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or "unduly burdensome or expensive" 
in light of the needs of the case); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(g) (requiring sanctions when attor-
neys fail to "reasonably inquire" before filing discovery requests, responses, or 
objections). 
147 See Order, supra note 140. The Rule states that a lawyer's signature on every 
filing, including pleadings, motions, and discovery papers, is a certification that the filing 
is premised on "reasonable inquiry," is well-grounded in fact and law, and is not submit-
ted for any inappropriate reason." The Rule requires sanctions for violations of the certi-
fication requirements. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
Closely related to the I 983 amendments were two abortive Advisory Committee 
attempts to amend Rule 68 to encourage settlement by permitting sanctions for the 
unreasonable rejection of settlement offers. A 1985 Supreme Court case may have ef-
fects similar to those intended by the two abortive attempts. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 
U.S. I (1985); see also infra notes 241-74 and accompanying text. 
148 I rely most in this paragraph on Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650-52. For instance, 
Rules 11, 16, and 26 substitute court control for lawyer self-regulation, and Rule 26 
limits considerably open-ended discovery. The proliferation of local Rules has under-
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make the Rules work as initially intended or to correct earlier errors 
by adopting proposals rejected in 1938. 149 Additional develop-
ments may be efforts to fill gaps in the original Rules 150 or may con-
stitute new understandings. 151 
Since the mid-l 970s, Congress has evinced greater interest in 
certain of these issues, interest which culminated in the 1988 pas-
sage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. 152 
That legislation modernizes much court rulemaking, increasing the 
processes and openness at all levels of the federal judiciary, while 
encouraging expanded experimentation with court-annexed arbitra-
tion, a principal form of Alternative Dispute Resolution. 153 
Public law litigation generally has increased, but the extent and 
timing of growth of specific types of public law litigation have va-
ried. Public interest litigation has increased significantly since the 
mid-1970s.154 Indeed, public interest litigants have become institu-
tutionalized participants in administrative proceedings and in court-
room litigation challenging agency activity. 155 Many suits today 
mined interfederal district court uniformity, while suggestions in the MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX LmGATION, SECOND (1985) and Rule 16 that several prototypical scheduling orders 
be developed for different kinds of cases have reduced intercase uniformity. Similarly, 
the rise of managerial judging and its formalization in Rule 16 illustrate attempts to 
adjust procedure to specific cases, thus eroding the trans-substantive premise of the 
original Rules. Moreover, the plethora of steps in lawsuits authorized by the 1983 
amendments seriously threatens the drafters' efforts to simplify litigation. 
149 For instance, Rule 16 may be an effort to have pretrial conferences limit the 
scope of cases or ferret out meritless actions. The specific provision regarding issue 
formulation institutes an ideal similar to one suggested by Clark in 1935 but rejected by 
the Committee. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 978-79. 
150 This appears true of Rule 16's reference to settlement. See Resnik, supra note 3, 
at 496, 527. 
151 For example, the 1983 amendments candidly recognize that substance and pro-
cedure are inseparable. See Subrin, supra note 21. at 1650-51. For a valuable sense of 
changed conceptualizations of the judiciary's responsibilities for case management in 
the concrete context of application of Rules I 6 and 26, see In re San Juan Dupont Plaza 
Hotel Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988). 
152 See Pus. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, lOOth 
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 
5983-87 (discussion of growing Congressional interest, including increased intervention 
in rulemaking). During the relevant period, there have been criticisms and suggestions 
for reform of the rulemaking process. See, e.g.' J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-
MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-exami-
nation, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975). But see Hazard, supra note 39, at 1287-94. 
153 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, 2077 (1988) (provisions modernizing rulemaking); 
28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (provisions regarding court-annexed arbitration). 
154 Increases in public interest litigation are difficult to document accurately because 
much relevant data need refinement. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 
1303. Numerous writers, however, acknowledge that public interest litigation has in-
creased. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 83, at 7; Resnik, supra note 3, at 510-12. 
155 Public interest litigants' vindication of substantive and procedural rights afforded 
earlier by courts and Congress have contributed to these developments. See supra notes 
83-99 and accompanying text. 
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contesting administrative decisionmaking have a "tripolar" party 
structure comprised of government, regulated interests, and public 
interest litigants. 156 The number, size, and types of public interest 
litigants, especially those with business or conservative orientations, 
have expanded. 157 These litigants have enjoyed considerable suc-
cess on the merits, winning hundreds of cases, 158 and in securing 
attorney fee awards.159 
Mass tort litigation has emerged as a new type of public law 
litigation since the mid-l 970s. 160 Much of this litigation involves 
compensatory claims of large numbers of plaintiffs allegedly injured 
by defective products, such as Agent Orange and the Dalkon 
Shield. 161 Although certain aspects of mass tort cases resemble pri-
vate two-party tort suits, they can pose complex party questions re-
lating to plaintiffs, defendants, and absentees 162 as well as 
complicated issues involving relief. 163 The comparatively small 
156 These cases often involve an even broader array of participants, such as local 
citizens or stace agencies, especially when the government is charged with responsibility 
for enforcing the laws. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 
370 (1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
I 57 See N. ARON, supra note l, at 74-78, ll5-2l; Houck, supra note 33 (discussing che 
expansion generally and business-oriented entities specifically). 
158 Two successes discussed below involve management of public lands. See Conner 
v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 705 F. 
Supp. 698 (D.C. C. 1989) (recent success). These litigants also have successfully chal-
lenged numerous deregulatory initiatives. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the .\'ew 
Deal, IOI HARV. L. REV. 421, 426 n. 17 (1987) and sources cited therein. 
I 59 Some recent Supreme Court cases suggest that public interest litigants may be 
less successful in securing future attorney fee awards. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 7ll (1987), 478 U.S. 546 (1986). Cf. 
Resnik, supra note 3, at 518-19, 3 l-32 (discussing Court decisions making less attractive 
provisions of major fee-shifting legislation); see also infra note 284. 
160 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). See Abraham, 
Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Diiemma of .\lass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 845, 849-93 ( l 987) (salient characteristics of mass torts); Marcus, supra note l 36, at 
671-75, 692 (analysis of"tort crisis" which now has eclipsed institutional reform litiga-
tion in significance); Mullenix, Class Resolution of the .\/ass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal 
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. l 039 (1986) (helpful analysis of mass tort litigation); Ro-
senberg, The Causal Connection in .\lass Exposure Cases: .-I .. Public Law .. 1'ision of the Tort 
System. 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (discussing problems peculiar to mass exposure 
accident claims). 
161 For helpful examination of those cases, see P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: 
MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); s. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S 
JUSTICE: 0NEjUDGE'S BATTLE TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD l.U.D. (1985). 
162 Professor Mullenix, for example, found existing Rule 23 inadequate in such cases 
and recommended special federal legislation. See Mullenix supra note l 60. Cf Abraham, 
supra note 160, at 876-80 (problems with Rule 23's application in mass tort cases). But 
cf. .-l.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 729-40 (courts increasingly rely on Rule 23 to solve problems 
mass tort cases create). 
W3 See Marcus, .-lpoca(\pse .\"ow? (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987) (dis-
cussing problems involved in structuring relief. especially judicial involvement in settle-
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number of mass tort cases concluded to date, their complexity, and 
disparate judicial treatment of them make uncertain the future of 
mass tort suits. ' 
Institutional reform litigation generally has decreased since the 
mid-1970s. It is unclear whether all types of institutional litigation, 
however, have declined. The number of civil rights class actions has 
plummeted from 1586 in 1975, to 798 in 1980, to 185 in 1986.164 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs continue to bring cases seeking reform of en-
tities, such as prisons and schools. One district judge recently en-
tered a far-reaching affirmative decree in a suit involving 
discrimination in housing and education by the City of Yonkers, 
New York, while a Texas district court ordered the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation to revamp its procedures for promoting Hispanics 
and members of other minority groups. 165 Although it is difficult to 
predict the future of institutional litigation, numerous recent devel-
opments suggest that it may be injeopardy.166 
Public interest litigants have brought, or sought to participate 
in, a growing number of federal civil cases to assert the rights, inter-
ests, or viewpoints oflarge, unorganized groups of people. This ac-
ment negotiations, in the Agent Orange case). Cf Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 201-203, 102 
Stat. 4646 (1988) (legislation addressing multi-party, multi-forum problems in mass in-
jury cases arising from single incidents, such as that in In re Sanjuan Dupont Plaza Hotel 
Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
164 See The Rise and Fallo/the Class Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at CS, col. 
I [hereinafter Class Actions]; cf Galanter, supra note 125, at 946 (class actions fell 73% 
from 1976 high of 3,584 to 971 in 1985); Marcus, supra note 136, at 688 (absolute 
number of institutional reform cases at height of popularity quite small); Resnik, supra 
note 3, at 511 (characterizing "structural reform" cases as "statistical rarities on the 
federal docket"). 
165 See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 
ajf'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987);judge Orders Sweeping Changes in the FBI's Promotion 
System, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at I, col. 2. 
166 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 5. But cf Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 57 
(even a Court opposed to public law litigation is reduced perforce to practicing such 
litigation). 
Numerous ideas explain the discrepancies observed between public interest and in-
stitutional reform litigation (mass tort litigation remains too nascent for comment). For 
instance, public interest litigation apparently has increased, because much of it resem-
bles traditional two-party private litigation-except one party is the government-and 
has been authorized by earlier statutory or case law. The decline in institutional litiga-
tion may be attributable to certain ways in which it contrasts with public interest litiga-
tion. For example, the relief sought in much institutional litigation continues to raise 
troubling questions of constitutional authority, federalism, and legitimacy. See Ruiz v. 
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, R.M.,J., concurring); Alliance to End 
Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 1984). Institutional litiga-
tion also involves complex, and often intractable, problems, such as the difficulties of 
reforming a recalcitrant bureaucracy or of securing resources from fiscally strapped leg-
islatures. For recent cases that afford a sense of these difficulties, see Grubss v. Norris, 
870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); Twelve john Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 
295, 298-301 (D.C. Cir. 1988), United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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tivity has generated new forms, understandings, relationships, and 
difficulties. Indeed, public law litigation may have transformed con-
ventional understandings of adjudication, of the judicial function, 
and of the components of a lawsuit. Public law litigation poses 
novel procedural difficulties whose resolution has proved problem-
atic under the Federal Rules. The following section examines how 
the federal courts have applied numerous Rules to certain difficult 
issues that public law litigation raises. This examination should en-
hance appreciation of these procedural complications while sug-
gesting possible approaches for treating them and promising 
avenues for future exploration. 
II 
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES To 
PUBLIC LAw LmGATION 
A. Introduction 
Judicial application of numerous Rules has adversely affected 
public interest litigants. This section will closely analyze Rule 8 
(covering pleading), Rule 11 (governing sanctions), Rule 68 (relat-
ing to "offers of judgment" or settlement and payment of costs), 
Rule 19 (regarding compulsory joinder of parties), and Rule 
24(a)(2) (respecting non-statutory intervention as of right). This 
section will also examine briefly the enforcement of other Rules that 
have been troubling for public interest litigants. Scrntiny of the ap-
plication of Rules 8, 11, 19, 24(a)(2) and 68 elucidates concepts in-
tegral to public law litigation, particularly those that distinguish it 
from private, traditional litigation. Moreover, enforcement of the 
five Rules has significance for much public law litigation and consid-
erable reliable data on their application exist. Analysis of these 
Rules permits comparatively detailed evaluation, but the five en-
compass sufficiently diverse procedural fields and are sufficiently 
numerous to afford some representativeness and to test out the hy-
pothesis that courts have enforced the Rules in ways problematic for 
public interest litigants. Brief examination of other Rules indicates 
that the difficulties observed in judicial application of Rules 8, 1 I, 
19, 24, and 68 to public law litigation are not peculiar to those Rules 
and suggests the existence of a pattern. 167 
B. Judicial Application of the Rules 
1. Federal Rule 8 
Rule 8, governing pleading, requires the plaintiff to submit a 
167 This Article briefly analyzes the other Rules because less reliable data exists on 
their application. 
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"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief."168 The Rule was intended to clarify and simplify 
pleading practice as it had existed under the codes while generally 
deemphasizing the significance of the pleadings.169 In 1955, the 
Advisory Committee rejected Ninth Circuit proposals that could 
have reinstituted code-type pleading, and no serious recommenda-
tions for alterations have been made since. 170 In 1957, the 
Supreme Coµrt placed its imprimatur on the liberal, flexible plead-
ing regime embodied in the Rules: "[A] complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief."171 Thus, the Court rejected fact 
pleading, the "bete noir of the codes,"172 and embraced notice plead-
ing: "[a]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the 
claim' that will give to defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's 
claim is and grounds upon which it rests."173 
Despite this apparent death knell for pleading practice, "de-
fendants continued to make motions to dismiss and courts contin-
ued to grant them." 174 Moreover, since the 1970s, numerous 
judges have imposed more rigorous requirements upon complaints 
filed in certain categories of cases, most importantly those alleging 
civil rights violations. Today every "circuit has articulated a require-
ment of particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints."175 
168 See FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a). Of course, if plaintiff's complaint fails to meet the Rule's 
requirements, defendant can move to have it dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). I rely sub-
stantially here on Marcus, supra note 12, and pertinent cases; cf. Wingate, A Special Plead-
ing Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677 
(1~84) (heightened pleading requirements in civil rights cases). 
169 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 439-40; Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and 
Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 396 (1980). For example, courts are to grant freely 
the opportunity to amend a pleading. See FED. R. C1v. P. 15(b). 
170 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445; Subrin, supra note 3, at 983-84. 
171 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted). 
172 Marcus, supra note 12, at 435. 
173 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
174 Marcus, supra note 12, at 434. After Conley, however, the "intense academic dis-
cussion" of pleadings that preceded it "stopped abruptly." Id. 
175 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d I, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Brennan 
v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 
1985). Both of these opinions include comprehensive compilations of the relevant 
cases, as does Roberts, supra note 169, at 417-19. Courts have required specificity in 
several other areas, including cases that implicate governmental officials' immunity. See, 
e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (warning lower federal courts of 
"artful pleading" and suggesting dismissal of complaints that fail to state compensable 
claim under Constitution); accord Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479. Another area treated mini-
mally here is complaints alleging conspiracies. See, e.g., Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 
1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); Marcus, supra note 12, at 450. Most of the cases assessed 
here come under the generic rubric of civil rights, a number of which invoke 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Cf. International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Chicago, 816 F.2d 337, 
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Numerous courts have found insufficient civil rights complaints 
that include vague, speculative, or conclusory allegations and have 
demanded factual specificity concerning the behavior, especially 
motive and intent, alleged to have contravened plaintiffs' rights. 
The Third Circuit, perhaps in the vanguard of this development, has 
specified the requirements that civil rights plaintiffs must satisfy. 176 
For example, this court has stated that a civil rights complaint will 
be dismissed if it "does not in any manner allege facts showing a 
nexus between acts of racial discrimination and the named individ-
ual defendants" 177 or it if does not "identify the particular conduct 
of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs." 178 The 
Third Circuit also recently observed that the "crucial questions are 
whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint 
is not frivolous and to provide defendants with adequate notice to 
frame an answer."179 
Some courts have been even more demanding, requiring that 
there be a factual showing of actual discriminatory intent, that 
claims be supported with references to material facts, or that plead-
ings specify sufficient instances of misbehavior related closely 
enough in time to sustain an inference ofliability. 18° Certainjudges 
340 (7th Cir. 1987} (Cudahy,J., dissenting) (application of more rigorous requirements 
to complaint alleging First Amendment violation); Marcus, supra, at 44749 (application 
of more rigorous requirements to complaints alleging securities fraud). 
176 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 449 ("leader in this movement has been the Third 
Circuit"). The then-Chief judge oftbe Third Circuit recently acknowledged the court's 
"longstanding rule [imposing] a higher standard on civil rights complaints" and selec-
tively reviewed the "long line of cases [establishing] that civil rights deprivations must 
be pleaded with more specificity than other civil complaints.'' District Council 47 v. 
Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316, 317 (3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert,J., dissenting). 
177 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 205 (3d Cir. 1980); accord 
Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973). 
178 Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1981); accord Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d 
79, 80 (3d Cir. 1985);Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
179 Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986). This 
articulation, the majority opinion in District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 
1986), Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), and Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 F.2d 1111, 
1114-15 (3d Cir. 1988) may reflect a moderating trend in the Third Circuit, although 
any apparent moderation may be attributable to the composition of panels or the facts of 
specific cases. See Frazier, 785 F.2d at 67-68; cf Bradiey, 795 F.2d at 319 (Aldisert, J., 
dissenting) (Bradley "majority interpret[s] ... four sentences [in Frazier] to eviscerate an 
entire line of relevant case law"). Cj Scott v. Rieht, 690 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (recent 
example of stringent approach's application by district judge in Third Circuit). 
180 See Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978) (requiring 
pleadings specifying instances of misbehavior); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978) (requiring references to material facts); 
Parish v. N.C.A.A., 506 F.2d 1028. 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring actual discrimina-
tory intent). 
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have analyzed complaints to determine whether plaintiffs were likely 
to prove their factual conclusions and have dismissed pleadings 
found deficient.1s1 
One of the first cases imposing stricter pleading requirements 
in civil rights litigation articulated most of the reasons still offered 
for doing so: 
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of 
cases brought under the Civil Rights Act. A substantial number of 
these cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts; 
they all cause defendants-public officials, policemen and citizens 
alike considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded no-
toriety. It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous 
and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still 
keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims. 182 
Numerous courts have adopted one or more of these rationales, and 
some judges have embellished the justifications or created others. 
The Third Circuit, for instance, has reasoned that requiring greater 
specificity in pleadings protects local governments from the threat 
of "massive interference" produced by litigation pursued for polit-
ical harassment as well as protects their "files from overbroad and 
irrelevant inquiries"183 and the police from onerous. discovery 
requests. 
Heightened pleading requirements in civil rights cases contra-
vene the letter and spirit of the Rules' pleading system and other 
aspects of the Rules as well as Supreme Court pronouncements. 
Federal courts may lack the requisite authority to demand more 
stringent pleading in this class of suits. 184 The Advisory Committee 
explicitly prescribed stricter pleading only in Rule 9, when a plaintiff 
alleges fraud, 185 rejected elevated standards and fact pleading when 
adopting Rule 8 in 1938, and has modified none of these deci-
sions.186 The Committee has also preserved a liberal pleading sys-
181 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 463-70 (citing Schreck and Jones v. Community Redev. 
Agency as examples of this phenomenon in context of fact pleading revival). Some fed-
eral judges have opposed the adoption of stricter requirements. See, e.g., United States v. 
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 207 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); cf. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 
F.2d l, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 
(1985) ("overly rigid application ... could lead to dismissal of meritorious claims"). 
182 Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968) Accord. Jones v. Commu-
nity Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d at 649; Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 
(3d Cir. 1976); Schreck, 463 F.2d at 622. 
183 See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 204-05; cf. Marcus, supra note 
12, at 436 (fact pleading is an effort to cope with litigation explosion, open-ended dis-
covery, and limited use of summary judgment). 
184 See, e.g., Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham,]., 
concurring); Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 925-27 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
185 See FEo. R. C1v. P. 9(b). 
186 See Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1482 (Higginbotham,]., concurring); United States v. Gus-
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tern which is meant to serve limited functions. When a court 
dismisses a civil rights complaint at the pleading stage doubting the 
plaintiff's success on the factual merits, the court essentially re-
quires the plaintiff to marshal evidence before discovery. This judi-
cial approach contradicts conventional learning about what 
information plaintiff must produce and a court may consider at that 
stage. 187 . 
Even if plaintiffs bring too many frivolous civil rights cases-a 
proposition the validity of which has been challenged 188-other 
mechanisms enable courts to achieve results similar to those accom-
plished by heightened pleading requirements. For instance, Rule 
56, prescribing summary judgment, is available. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court's recent approval of expanded use of Rule 56 and 
the increased judicial control over discovery effected by amended 
Rule 26 enhance the attractiveness of these alternatives to elevated 
pleading requirements.189 
Stringent pleading standards in civil rights actions may have im-
portant implications for plaintiffs. They violate tenets of fundamen-
tal fairness, imposing upon a whole class of lawsuits and claimants 
more onerous demands without justification. These stricter require-
ments resurrect the rejected regime of fact pleading, apply the dis-
credited notion of "disfavored claims" 190 to a type of litigation the 
Supreme Court has found essential to liberty,1 91 and impose bur-
dens on a category of litigants least able to overcome them. Courts 
will dismiss numerous civil rights cases earlier in the litigation pro-
cess than they otherwise might, and some of these dismissals will be 
improper. For instance, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims typi-
cally have substantially less resources and information than govern-
mental defendants. Stringent pleading requirements could 
disproportionately affect civil rights litigants by demanding informa-
tion in their complaints that they lack the money to secure or that 
tin-Bacon Div., CertainTeed Prods., 426 F.2d 539, 542-43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 832 (1970); Thompson v. Village of Evergreen Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. 
lll. 1980); see also Wingate, supra note 168, at 692. 
187 See, e.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D.111. 1982); Hill v. 
City of Atlanta, 91 F.R.D. 528, 532 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Marcus, supra note 12, at 462-71. 
188 See, e.g., Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Wingate, supra note 
168, at 688 (challenging the proposition that civil rights cases are disproportionately 
frivolous). 
189 See infra notes 368-75 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 56 indicating 
expanded use may pose difficulties for public interest litigants); supra note 146 and ac-
companying text (Rule 26). Amended Rule 16 (governing pretrial conferences) pro-
vides an additional alternative to enhanced pleading requirements. 
190 For discussion and criticism of this notion, see Marcus, supra note 12, at 471-73. 
191 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Newman v. Piggie Park En-
ters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); But cf. infra note 284 (Court's ambivalent civil rights 
jurisprudence). 
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would only be available upon discovery. Judicial application of the 
1983 amendments, especially Rule 11, could have certain similar ef-
fects on public interest litigants. 
2. The 1983 Amendments with Special Reference to Federal Rule 11 
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules were intended to 
increase the accountability of attorneys and judicial control of law-
suits to enhance the discovery process, and to promote the imposi-
tion of sanctions when warranted.192 Rule 16 permits district judges 
to manage litigation more thoroughly, particularly before trial, by 
providing for pretrial conferences and scheduling orders. 193 Rule 
26 increases judicial control over the discovery process by authoriz-
ing limitations on its timing and scope.194 Rule 11 states that an 
attorney's signature on a paper constitutes a certification that to the 
best of the attorney's "knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argnment for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose." 195 The amendment to Rule 11 also mandates 
imposition of sanctions, such as attorneys' fees, for violations of its 
proV1s10ns. 
This subsection will examine the application of Rule 11 in more 
detail than the application of the other 1983 revisions. Attorneys' 
vigorous use of Rule 11 and its compulsory nature have already led 
to approximately 1,000 opinions (and to thousands more that have 
not been reported) under the amendment. Numerous writers have 
assessed the Rule and have compiled considerable data on its appli-
cation.196 In contrast, Rules 16 and 26 afford fewer opportunities 
192 See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). 
For the description of the amendments, I rely on the sources cited in notes 142-47 supra. 
For developments subsequent to the August 1983 amendment ofRule 11, I rely most on 
S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSmON: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE 
ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; To-
bias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485 (1988-89); Vairo, Rule 11: 
A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for 
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings] and the 
reported cases. 
193 See FED. R. C1v. P. 16; cf. supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (more discus-
sion of amendment). 
194 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text (more discussion 
of amendment). 
195 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This Article does not examine Rule ll's prohibition upon 
papers filed for improper purposes, because few courts have imposed sanctions for the 
proscription's violation and it has less potential for chilling public law litigation than the 
reasonable prefiling inquiry requirements. 
196 See sources cited supra note 192; Lafrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 332 n.2 (1988). (comprehensive, recent compilation of 
additional secondary sources). Moreover, there is a new study conducted under the aus-
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and incentives to invoke their provisions. Judicial activity under 
those amendments also is more discretionary and, thus, less likely to 
result in orders, much less reported decisions. 
It remains too early to ascertain how courts will ultimately apply 
Rule I l or to gauge all of the effects of such enforcement. More-
over, relying on reported opinions warrants considerable caution. 
For example, much judicial activity involving Rule I I, even orders 
imposing sanctions, has not been reported, while judges writing 
opinions calling for sanctions may marshal the facts in ways 
favorable to their determinations. I97 Nonetheless, the reported 
cases suggest some problematic trends in judicial application of the 
Rule. Those opinions can be instructive, as when their very publica-
tion is meant to serve as a deterrent. I 9 8 
Recently compiled data on reported opinions indicate that 
sanctions have been sought from, and imposed upon, plaintiffs in 
public law litigation, especially civil rights and employment discrimi-
nation litigation, considerably more often than in other kinds of fed-
eral civil litigation. I 99 Professor Nelken found that "although civil 
rights cases accounted for only 7 .6% of the civil filings between 
I983 and I985, 22.39% of the Rule 11 cases involve civil rights 
claims."200 Professor Vario who surveyed the nearly 700 reported 
Rule 11 decisions rendered between August I, 1983 (the amend-
ment's effective date) and December I5, I987, offered specific data 
regarding cases in which sanctions were requested ·and imposed: 
pices of the Federal Judicial Center. See T. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PRO-
CESS (1988). The "Center for Constitutional Rights [also is preparing to undertake] a 
national project to gather information concerning implementation of Rule 11." See 
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988); cf. G.joSEPH, 
C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (2d ed. 1988) (re-
cent ABA publication surveying developing law of sanctions). 
I 97 See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the 
Stroggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1339-40 (1986) ("without 
access to the pleadings, or to the parties' supporting papers, the court's opinion is the 
only source from which to discern the issues"). The Third Circuit Task Force which 
collected data on all Rule 11 activity for a one year period in the circuit warned that 
published opinions are a "hazardous basis for inferring effects," especially when it is 
clear that the law is developing and developing differently nationwide and when it is 
unclear whether law on the books or on computer is fairly representative of that applied 
by district courts. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 3. For more suggestions 
regarding these issues, see id. at 4-6, 44-45, 55-58. 
I 98 A Chicago firm, for instance, reportedly spent thousands of dollars to reverse a 
small sanction because of peer pressure and concern for its reputation. See Has the Profes-
sions Attempt to Curb Ludicrous Litigation Actually Boomeranged?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1988, 
at B 11, col. I [hereinafter Rule 11 Boomerang]. 
I 99 I rely in this paragraph on TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192; Nelken, supra 
note 197; Vairo, supra note 192. 
200 Nelken, supra note 197, at 1327. Professor Nelken also provided data on the 
"geography of Rule 11," the circumstances in which parties seek sanctions, and how 
courts resolve sanctions issues. Id. at 1326-29. 
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Civil rights and employment discrimination cases are the subject 
of28.l % of the Rule 11 cases (191 of the 680 requests). Plaintiffs 
are the target of the sanction request in 165 of these cases, 86.4%, 
which is somewhat higher than average (78.8%). Plaintiffs are 
sanctioned in 71.5% of the cases in which they are the target, a 
figure that is a full 17.3% higher than the average for plaintiffs in 
all other cases (54.2%). Defendants are targeted in 13.6% of the 
cases, and sanctioned in 50% of these cases, but this represents 
only 6.8% of all civil rights and employment discrimination 
cases.201 
303 
The Third Circuit Task Force, which assessed all Rule 11 activity in 
that circuit from July l, 1987 throughjune 30, 1988, provided simi-
lar data: 
Civil rights and employment discrimination cases account for 
18.2% (24/132) of the Rule 11 motions in the survey [28.1 %]. 
Plaintiffs are the "targets" of 70.8% (17/24) of the motions in 
such cases [86.4%], and they are sanctioned pursuant to 47.1 % 
(8/17) of such motions [71.5% ]. [That rate] is considerably 
higher than the rate (6/71 or 8.45%) for plaintiffs in non-civil 
rights cases. 202 
Numerous courts' application of amended Rule 11 has jeopard-
ized litigation seeking to vindicate new legal theories, less popular 
and test cases as well as suits which plaintiffs cannot easily plead and 
prove without data that defendants possess. When treating lawyers' 
responsibilities to conduct reasonable pre-filing inquiries into their 
cases' legal premises, judges have applied Rule 11 "zealously 
against plaintiffs in 'disfavored' lawsuits," many of which have been 
characterized as "very close cases."203 For example, the federalju-
20 I Vairo, supra note 192, at 200-0 l. Professor Vairo also provided a "statistical pro-
file of Rule 11," which considers whether the Rule is a defendant's tool, its possible 
chilling effect, its growth areas, and the circuit courts' role in enforcement. Id. at 199-
203. Professor Vairo recently observed that "nothing substantially different has hap-
pened" since she completed her study. Telephone conversation with Professor Ge-
orgene Vairo, Fordham University, School of Law (Mar. 14, 1989). My own 
impressionistic survey of reported opinions and those on Lexis since Professor Vairo 
concluded her assessment indicates that the level of Rule 11 activity in civil rights cases 
has remained relatively constant, although plaintiffs apparently have been sanctioned at 
a some what lower rate. The Third Circuit Task Force found Professor Vairo's statistics 
"highly problematic" because of "under-inclusiveness and double-counting" and be-
cause of "possible biases in publication practices and possible differential rates of ap-
peal." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 58. 
202 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 59, 69. The Task Force also provided 
much data and many observations on Rule 11 's application which are helpful, because it 
conducted the first empirical study of unreported Rule 11 activity. 
203 Vairo, supra note 192, at 217; see, e.g., Jennings v.Joshua independent School 
Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1989); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 
194 (7th Cir. 1985); if. G.josEPH, C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 199, at 28-29 
(many sanction cases are fact-intensive close calls). 
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diciary has enforced this part of the amendment with comparative 
stringency in employment discrimination and civil rights litiga-
tion,204 even though courts generally have treated attorney obliga-
tions regarding the law leniently.205 Correspondingly, numerous 
courts imposing sanctions in civil rights suits have premised their 
decisions on the finding that plaintiffs were pursuing frivolous legal 
theories.206 Courts have sanctioned those who bring securities 
fraud, RICO, and related trade regulation cases much less often on 
this basis, although the law in these fields is only minimally more 
unsettled and dynamic than in civil rights.2°7 A small number of 
judges has explicitly recognized these difficulties. For instance, 
"some judges are avoiding Rule 11 until 'the line between creativity 
and frivolity' is clarified."208 One circuit judge remarked that "due 
process, unfortunately, is an area where creativity and frivolity 
sometimes threaten to merge."209 
Courts in general have assessed more rigorously attorneys' re-
sponsibilities to inquire into their suits' factual bases than their legal 
premises, while judges have vigorously applied Rule 1 i to civil 
rights cases, closely scrutinizing their factual bases and the litigants-' 
pre-filing factual investigations.210 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 
204 See Tobias, supra note 192, at 492. Vairo, supra note 192, at 205. See, e.g., Szabo 
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing majority for "consuming five dense paragraphs" to show plain-
tiff's due process theory "wacky"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 110 (1988). 
205 Some judges have created a category of "technical" violations which are effec-
tively ignored. E.g., Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1987) (collection ofrele-
vant cases); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 918 (1987) (civil rights case in which the court subscribed to technical violation idea 
but expressly rejected special treatment of such claims). See generally Vario, supra note 
192, at 205, 213-17. 
206 See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 
(3d Cir. 1988); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See Tobias, 
supra note 192, at 492; Vairo, supra note 192, at 202; cf. Plausible Pleadings, supra note 192, 
at 640-42 (examples of judges' conflicting opinions on what constitutes frivolous legal 
theory). 
207 See Vairo, supra note 192, at 201-02. See, e.g., Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782 (6th 
Cir. 1989); Creative Bath Prod. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 
1988) (recent RICO cases). 
208 Rule 11 Boomerang, supra note 198 (quotingjudge Gerard Goettel of the Southern 
District of New York). 
209 Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); cf. Woodrum v. Woodward 
County, 866 F.2d 1121, ll27 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding sanctions' imposition would 
operate to chill civil rights plaintiffs who argue in good faith for modification or exten-
sion of rights and remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); O'Connell v. Champion Int'l 
Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (although statute oflimitations is good defense 
to employment discrimination suit, appellate court defers to districtjudge's finding that 
Rule 11 not violated because plaintiffs had "non-frivolous legal arguments" for avoiding 
limitations bar). 
210 See Tobias, supra note 192, at 493; Vairo, supra note 192, at 205, 218-19; Plausible 
Pleadings, supra note 192, at 635-37. 
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trial court's decision to dismiss a civil rights action and to impose 
Rule 11 sanctions because plaintiff's counsel undertook insufficient 
factual inquiry and filed a "ponderous, extravagant, and overblown 
complaint."211 The circuit court observed that the plaintiff "would 
have stated an actionable claim" had he introduced certain facts, but 
the plaintiff probably could only have uncovered those facts through 
discovery.212 Correspondingly, judicial application of Rule ll's 
"grounded in fact" requirement has had the effect of demanding 
increased specificity in pleading, if only to resist potential sanctions 
motions.213 The development of elevated fact pleading threatens 
the liberal pleading regime of the Rules. It also contravenes the 
longstanding understanding that plaintiffs need not adduce at the 
pleading stage facts that only may be available after discovery to 
which plaintiffs have been entitled.214 Judge Pratt of the Second 
Circuit astutely described this "Catch 22": "no information until 
litigation, but no litigation without information."21 5 In this situa-
tion and numerous others, plaintiffs not only lose their cases but 
they or their attorneys also may incur sanctions. 
The federaljudiciary has offered relatively little justification for 
its application of Rule 11. Practically no courts specifically address 
the compiled statistical data; only a few mention the treatment of 
civil rights litigants. Most judges merely state that they are imple-
menting Rule 11 's purposes, such as deterring frivolous litiga-
tion.216 Some courts acknowledge that application of the Rule may 
pose general problems and difficulties specific to civil rights cases. 
Several judges, in the context of civil rights cases, express rather 
general concern that abuse of Rule 11 could "stifle the creativity of 
211 Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 206 (quoting the district court's opinion). 
212 Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205-08 (facts concerning police officer's intent and govern-
mental policies). 
213 See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Tow-
ing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13, 20 (N.D. lll. 1984). Judge Easterbrook, the author of Szabo, 
stated that it is not permissible to file suit and use discovery as the sole means of deter-
mining whether plaintiff has a case. See 823 F.2d at 1083. He later seems to have mod-
erated that view by observing that Rule 11 does not modify the " 'notice pleading' 
approach of the federal rules." See Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 
1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Tobias, supra note 192, at 493-95 (more discus-
sion of this and related issues examined in remainder of this paragraph). 
214 See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1279; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 
1987). Thus, plaintiffs could be disadvantaged similarly to the ways they are by judicial 
application of Rule 8. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanying text. 
215 Johnson by Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt,]., 
dissenting) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). For analysis indicating that judicial deci-
sions actually imposing sanctions have disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs nearly as 
much as determinations finding them in violation of Rule 1 I. see Tobias, supra note 192, 
at 498-501. 
~16 See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1082; Johnson, 788 F.2d at 854; Lepucki v. Van 
Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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litigants in pursuing novel factual or legal theories"217 while a few 
judges state that the imposition of sanctions might preclude access 
to the courts for civil rights plaintiffs.218 Some judges urge caution 
in applying the Rule to civil rights suits.21 9 
Judicial application of Rule 11 since its 1983 amendment has 
had numerous adverse implications, especially for civil rights plain-
tiffs. The frequency with which courts have imposed Rule 11 sanc-
tions in civil rights cases has effectively revitalized the antiquated 
notion of "disfavored" claims.220 This result contravenes Supreme 
Court pronouncements as well as. Congressional substantive, proce-
dural, and fee-shifting legislation indicating that civil rights litiga-
tion should receive solicitous judicial treatment.221 Judicial 
application of Rule 11 has eroded basic understandings reflected in 
the 1938 Rules, such as liberal pleading and the predisposition to 
resolve disputes on the merits.222 Some commentators fear that 
placing "excessive emphasis on sanctions may lead to the greatest 
evil of the past-the prospect of too many cases being dismissed or 
litigated with little regard to the merits."223 Indeed, Judge Cudahy, 
when dissenting from a decision to remand for fact-finding on the 
Rule 11 issue, perceptively wondered whether the circuit panel ap-
peared "almost at the point of saying that the main question before 
the court is not 'Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?' " 224 
Such judicial application makes civil rights plaintiffs and their 
counsel particularly vulnerable to Rule 11 sanctions. Public law 
suits look and are less traditional and pose more difficult problems 
217 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885 (5th Cir. I988); see also 
Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561. 
218 See lfoodmm, 866 F.2d at 1127; Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 
1986). 
219 See Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988); Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085-86 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). Increased solicitude for civil rights and employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs appears in some recent Rule I I opinions. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton 
Int'! Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1989); Dickens v. Children's Mercy Hospital, I24 
F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989). Nonetheless, a panel of the Second Circuit explicitly 
refused to accord special treatment under Rule I I to civil rights litigation or to attorneys 
who represent poor or minority clients. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at I280-81. Some judges have 
exhibited little solicitude for, and even hostility toward, such suits and lawyers. See, e.g., 
S:abo, 823 F.2d at 1083-84; infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
220 See Vairo, supra note I92, at 200-01, 232-33; supra notes 200-02 and accompany-
ing text; cf supra note 190 (discussing history and antiquated nature of notion). 
221 See supra note I91 and accompanying text (Court pronouncements); supra notes 
81, 91, 95, 97-98 and accompanying text (Congressional legislation). 
222 See supra notes 20, I68-91 and accompanying text (basic 1938 understandings); 
cf supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (erosion of understandings). 
223 Vairo, supra note I92, at 232; cf Marcus, supra note 12, at 436-37, 450-5I, 492-93 
(implying that undue emphasis on fact pleading could result in dismissals with insuffi-
cient regard for merits). 
224 Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy,]., dissenting). Accord Yancey v. Carroll County, 
674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987). 
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of proof than conventional private cases. Public law litigation is 
often premised on unique, relatively untested, or unpopular legal 
theories, thus making it peculiarly susceptible to the assertion that it 
is frivolous.225 Similarly, many of these cases may be based on lim-
ited factual information, because the relevant data are difficult to 
collect, are in the hands of the defendant, or implicate the defend-
ant's mental state and, therefore, can be secured only through dis-
covery. The limited resources of those who pursue public law 
litigation and of their lawyers exacerbate these problems. They 
have little time or money to conduct investigations, to compile and 
analyze information, to research and articulate pertinent legal theo-
ries, or to make "ingenious and sophisticated" arguments that will 
successfully repel requests for sanctions.226 For instance, a district 
judge "assessed nearly $54,000 in sanctions against Julius Cham-
bers, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund."227 
Judicial application of Rule 11 may be chilling civil rights litiga-
tion, although this is an extremely controversial issue. The practi-
cally routine nature of Rule 11 motions by defense counsel in civil 
rights cases may dampen plaintiffs' enthusiasm to pursue these 
claims, and members of the "civil rights bar [view themselves] as the 
primary victims of Rule 11. "228 The threat of satellite litigation 
over, much less actual imposition of, sanctions may dissuade liti-
gants from bringing suits and may deter attorneys from accepting 
cases that require factual development or involve novel questions of 
law. When lawyers file such cases, they may be reluctant to pursue 
225 See id. at 1085-86 (due process is area where "creativity and frivolity some.times 
threaten to merge"); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("first attorney to challenge Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly bringing a 
frivolous action, but his efforts ... eventually led to Brown v. Board of Education"). 
226 See Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy,]., dissenting). Several circuits have recog-
nized that resource constraints are relevant to sanctions decisionmaking. See Doering v. 
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988); Muthig 
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Plausible Plead-
ings, supra note 192, at 643-48 (more discussion of ideas in text). The Third Circuit Task 
Force stated that its "speculations about civil rights plaintiffs prompt us to urge that 
more attention be given to the possibility that the amended Rule has a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on the poor." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 72. 
227 See Rule I I Boomerang, supra note 198; Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1391 
(E.D.N.C. 1987). Another judge recently imposed a one million dollar sanction on a 
non-profit legal organization. See Giving Law Teeth (And Using Them 011 Lau~\·ers), N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4, col. 2. 
228 See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. I988) 
(quoted language drawn from memorandum prepared in connection with national pro-
ject mentioned supra note 199); Vairo, supra note 192, at 217 (Rule I I aggres~ively in-
voked against civil righls plaintiffs); cf. Mary Anne Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90. 
99 (3d Cir. I988) (counseling against Rule's routine invocation); TASK FORCE REPORT. 
supra note 192, at 60, 72 (sharing some concerns of civil rights bar about Rule I I but 
finding that sanctions motions not routine in civil rights cases in Third Circuit). 
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new or unusual legal theories or to advocate with adequate vigor 
their clients' causes because of the threat of sanctions.229 
Certain difficulties with Rule 11 's application arose despite the 
protestations of the Advisory Committee and some courts; other dif-
ficulties mean that the gravest fears of the amendment's critics may 
be realized. 23o The Committee recognized the possibility for abuse 
of Rule 11 and expressly disavowed any intent to "chill an attorney's 
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing legal or factual theories,"231 yet 
these problems apparently have materialized.232 Notwithstanding 
the Committee's suggestion that pleaders could continue to file 
without information only available upon discovery,233 some courts 
have effectuated the "Catch 22" that the amendment's opponents 
feared most by reading Rule 11 in ways that require greater specific-
ity in pleading.234 
Finally, it is important to remember that the material above is 
premised on reported cases and, thus, may be skewed or represent 
the tip of the iceberg. Courts have imposed sanctions in many situa-
tions without reported opinions, while in other instances the threat 
of sanctions may have been used informally to cajole, discourage, or 
bludgeon certain litigants and attorneys. 235 Indeed, a number of 
lawyers who litigate public law cases believe that Rule 11 constitutes 
an ongoing threat to their efforts, while specific anecdotes involving 
229 See Nelken, supra note 197, at 1340-44; Vairo, supra note 192, at 214, 217; Plausi-
ble Pleadings, supra note 192, at 643, 648. 
230 Critics feared most the "Catch-22," mentioned supra note 214 and accompanying 
text and infra note 234 and accompanying text. See Vairo, supra note 192, at 220; Don-
aldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussion of other concerns of 
critics, such as chilling adversarial zeal); Nelken, supra note 197, at 1338-39 (same). 
231 See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee note on 1983 amendments, reprinted in 
97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); see also Nelken, supra note 197, at 1339 (additional, related 
statements of the then-Committee chair and then-Reporter). Numerous judges have 
subscribed to these propositions. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 885; Donaldson, 819 F.2d 
at 1561. 
232 See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. The actual chilling effect, like 
informal threats to impose sanctions, is difficult to document. See infra note 236. See 
general(v Tobias, supra note 192, at 503-06 (review of relevant information concluding 
that insights of informed observers, reasonable inferences drawn from Rule 1 1 experi-
ence to date, and accumulating anecdotal evidence show that there has been some chil-
ling and considerable likelihood of recurrence). 
233 See advisory committee note, supra note 231, 97 F.R.D. at 198-201; see also Plausi-
ble Pleadings, supra note 192, at 634-35. 
234 See Vairo, supm note 192, at 220; supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (difficulties in relying on unreported 
opinions). The assertion as to the threat of sanctions is premised on conversations with 
members of the public interest bar. For an example of a threat that was carried out in 
the context of Rule 16, see infra note 240 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit 
Task Force observed that "approximately sixty percent of the total Rule 11 iceberg and 
two thirds of the sanctions iceberg do not appear on the screen," but warned that data 
for one year in one circuit were a "weak base for drawing inferences in other parts of the 
country." See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 59. 
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threats to impose sanctions abound. 236 
The considerations mentioned above also pertain to judicial ap-
plication of the other 1983 amendments. Few reported cases impli-
cate Rule 26 apparently because attorneys have resolved their 
discovery problems with Rule 37.237 Rule 26, however, does war-
rant future examination as discovery is quite important to much 
public law litigation. Those who pursue public interest litigation 
often lack data that government and industry possess, while those 
who bring mass tort cases frequently need information about de-
fendants' behavior only available through discovery.238 Moreover, 
the discretion Rule 26 grants judges to tailor discovery to the needs 
of the case and to the resources of the litigants could affect public 
interest litigants, because they will nearly always have fewer re-
sources, and greater need for information, than their opponents.239 
There has been a number of reported cases under Rule 16 gov-
erning pretrial conferences-but too few to reveal meaningful pat-
terns. Rule 16 determinations are likely to be peculiarly fact-specific 
and of limited value, absent a full understanding of the issues at 
stake, while muchjudicial activity under Rule 16 is discretionary and 
of low visibility. The courts' activity can have important implica-
tions for public interest litigants, as when judges offer suggestions 
regarding settlement that range from polite recommendations to 
less than subtle demands. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently 
found that Rule 16 did not authorize a districtjudge to hold an at-
torney in criminal contempt for refusing to submit his client's civil 
rights action to a non-binding summary jury trial. 240 Thus, judicial 
2~6 See supra note 228 and accompanying text (civil rights bar views itself as principal 
victim of Rule l l). The anecdotes were gleaned from conversations with members of 
the public interest bar. The exact nature of the threats and specific incidents are difficult 
to document, because suggestions that sanctions may be imposed can be quite subtle 
and because civil rights lawyers are understandably reluctant to jeopardize relationships 
with judges before whom they must subsequently appear. The study mentioned, supra 
note 199, may ameliorate some of these problems. See generally Tobias, supra note 192, at 
50 l-02 (more discussion of these issues). 
237 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
238 See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and 
Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 572 (1979) (public interest litigants lack data); cf. supra 
note 161 and accompanying text (mass tort cases). 
239 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). Cf. The Summary judgment Rule, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 
1987, at D2, col. 1 (observation by Professor Vairo that "it took a lot of time and discov-
ery in the Ford Pinto case to uncover certain incriminating documents"). 
240 The appellate court stated that Rule 16 was "not intended to require that an 
unwilling litigant he sidetracked from the normal course oflitigation." The circuit court 
observed that the Rule's coercive use could alter the balance struck by Congress and the 
Supreme Court "between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual 
litigant," by, for example, affecting "seriously the well-established rules concerning dis-
covery and work-product privilege." Strandell v.Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88 
(7th Cir. 1988). But see Homeowners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. 
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activity under Rule 16 warrants future monitoring. Finally, 
although Rule 11 implicates issues of litigation financing, those 
questions are addressed more directly in three recent Supreme 
Court cases. 
3. Litigation Financing with Special Reference to Federal Rule 68 
Litigation financing has special significance for public interest 
litigants because they generally have relatively meager resources 
with which to pursue claims. The Supreme Court has recently ap-
plied three Rules-68, 23(e), and 54(d)-which implicate litigation 
financing. This subsection will analyze the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of Rule 68 more thoroughly because the issues raised in 
its decision resemble those in the case involving Rule 23(e). The 
opinion applying Rule 54(d) is simply narrow in scope. 
Rule 68 relates to offers of judgment or settlement and the pay-
ment of costs. 241 The Rule, which has been amended minimally 
since its adoption in 1938, is intended to facilitate settlement and to 
minimize prolonged litigation by requiring a plaintiff who reject~ a 
timely pretrial settlement offer more favorable than the ultimate 
judgment to pay post-offer costs. 242 However, Rule 68 "has rarely 
Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-46 
(E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Arn. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988); 
but cf. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v.Joseph Oat Co., 871F.2d648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 
1989) (appellate court affirmance of sanction imposed on party for failing to send corpo-
rate representative to court-ordered settlement conference). 
241 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. See generally 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL 
PRAL"TICE ch. 68 (1984) (analysis of the Rule from a private law perspective); 12 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 3001-05 (1973) 
(same); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (analysis of the 
Rule from a private law perspective including thorough evaluation of recent proposed 
amendments); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of 
Rule 68 to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CONN. L. REv. 949 (1984) 
(analysis of the rule from a public law perspective). 
242 Rule 68 reads: 
At any time more than IO days before the trial begins, a party de-
fending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow 
judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or prop-
erty or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If 
within IO days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves writ-
ten notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer 
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and there-
upon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be 
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a 
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the 
costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made 
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liabil-
ity of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or 
judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be deter-
mined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an 
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made 
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been invoked and has been considered largely ineffective as a means 
of achieving its goals. " 243 Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee re-
cently proposed amending the Rule and the Supreme Court re-
cently applied it in ways that could significantly affect public law 
litigation. 244 
The chief reason for Rule 68's perceived failure has been that 
throughout most of the Rule's existence judges and lawyers consid-
ered the term "costs" to exclude attorneys' fees.245 The small 
amount at stake--court costs, filing fees and the like-discouraged 
parties' invocation of the Rule.246 Thus the Advisory Committee, 
responding to increased dissatisfaction with the desuetude into 
which Rule 68 had lapsed and to the "litigation explosion," pro-
posed amendment of the Rule in Augnst 1983.247 That proposal 
explicitly included reasonable attorneys' fees in post-offer costs and 
expenses248 and specified that courts might reduce the sum awarded 
if they found expenses to be "excessive or unjustified under all of 
the circumstances."249 Moreover, the proposed Rule expressly ex-
cluded from its purview class actions, a device important to pursuit 
of some public law litigation. 250 
before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than IO days 
prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or ex-
tent of liability. 
243 See proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68 advisory committee note on 1983 Amendment, 
reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 363, 363 (1983). 
244 The analysis below differs from that· of other Rules. It considers the Advisory 
Committee's work, provisions of the United States Code pertaining to fee-shifting, and 
the relationship among the Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress with respect 
to Rule amendment. However, analysis of all of these is meant to enhance understand-
ing of their interrelations and should afford insights for future work on the Rules. 
245 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. l, 21-22 (1985) (Brennan,]., dissenting); Silver-
stein & Rosenblatt, supra note 24 l, at 956. 
246 See proposed advisory committee note, supra note 243, 98 F.R.D. at 363. An-
other reason identified for the Rule's disuse was that it "is a 'one-way street,' available 
only to those defending against claims .... " Id. 
24 7 Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 
353, 361-67 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Proposa[j. The reasons for amendment are in a 
document prepared by the Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee. See W. 
MANSFIELD & A. MILLER, PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF RULE 68: BACKGROUND MEMORAN-
DUM 8 (1984) [hereinafter BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM]. 
248 "[T]he offeree must pay the cost and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees .... " Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee note, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. at 
353. 
249 See id. at 366. Use of the word unjustified was meant to "permit the judge to 
deny expenses altogether when, because of circumstances (for example, the ... impor-
tance of the issues ('test case') ... an award basically would be unfair." Id. 
250 See 1983 Proposal, supra note 247, 98 F.R.D. at 363. Class actions were excluded 
because the offeree's rejection would "burden a named representative-offeree with the 
risk of exposure to heavy liability for costs and expenses that could not be recouped 
from unnamed class members [which] could lead to a conflict of interest between the 
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The 1983 proposal was very controversial and provoked sharp 
criticism from public interest litigants.251 They primarily feared that 
implementation of proposed Rule 68 could have a chilling effect on 
civil rights litigation, either deterring its initiation or forcing prema-
ture, deficient settlements of actions that were commenced. Critics 
perceived the revision as a threat to the continuing operation of the 
Congressionally-adopted and Supreme Court-approved dual stan-
dard for shifting fees in civil rights cases. Under this dual standard, 
prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily recovered attorneys' fees, but suc-
cessful defendants normally did not.252 Opponents contended that 
application of the 1983 proposal could require public interest liti-
gant plaintiffs who lost, and even those who prevailed, to assume 
post-offer attorneys' fees. 253 Granting the judiciary discretion to 
decrease fee awards failed to ameliorate these difficulties, because it 
was impossible to predict whether courts would choose to exercise 
such discretion. The amendment would force plaintiffs to estimate 
relatively early in a case, and often with too little data to make a 
sufficiently informed determination, the precise value of a settle-
ment offer and exactly how a court might ultimately rule under the 
named representative and other members of the class." Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68 
advisory committee note, 98 F.R.D. at 367. 
251 I rely most here on Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 424 (1986); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241; Simon, supra 
note 241. 
252 For example, the Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), stated that successful plaintiffs "should 
ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an 
award unjust" and that successful defendants should recover fees only when plaintiff's 
litigation was "clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes." See S. 
REP. No. lOlI, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976). Congress in passing such fee-shifting 
legislation meant to encourage vigorous private enforcement of civil rights laws and 
pursuit of new, complex legal theories which facilitate development of constitutional 
and statutory law. See id. Some of that legislation is not in the civil rights area. See 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 44-46 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of Brennan,]., dissent-
ing) (comprehensive compendium of fee-shifting legislation). The Court placed its im-
primatur on the dual standard in several important opinions. See International 
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2735 (1989); Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 
412, 421 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
253 See Simon, supra note 241, at 14-16; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1074, 
I 076-77 n.12; Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241, at 963. The lack of predictability 
attributed to the proposal's phrasing and to the advisory committee note were sources 
of difficulty. For instance, the 1983 Proposal, 98 F.R.D. at 361, spoke of an offer to settle 
for the "money or property or to the effect specified in [the] offer," while defendants 
typically make offers in monetary terms. Thus, would ajudge rule in favor ofa plaintiff 
who, having rejected a $500 settlement offer, is "unable to prove actual damages at trial 
and recovers only nominal damages of $1, but who nevertheless demonstrates the un-
constitutionality of the challenged practice and obtains an injunction?" Marek, 473 U.S. 
at 32 n.48 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Fiss, supra, at 1080. 
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proposal. 254 
The Advisory Committee withdrew its 1983 proposal and is-
sued a second one in August 1984.255 The second proposal would 
have granted judges substantial discretion to impose appropriate 
sanctions, including attorneys' fees, when courts found that a settle-
ment offer "was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary de-
lay and needless increase in the cost of litigation."25 6 Thus, the 
1984 revision was intended to respond to certain criticisms of the 
existing Rule and of the earlier proposal by importing amended 
Rule ll's sanctioning concepts.257 Nonetheless, the 1984 version 
provoked many of the same criticisms as its predecessor, while cre-
ating some additional difficulties of its own.258 Most importantly, 
the possibility that public interest litigants could be held responsible 
for post-offer attorneys' fees meant that the potential for chilling the 
initiation and continuation of public law litigation remained.259 
The difficulties raised by the two rejected Advisory Committee 
proposals to revise Rule 68 could be realized with a 1985 Supreme 
Court decision. In Marek v. Chesny,260 the Court considered the in-
terrelation of Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards 
Act of 1976.261 That statute, in recognition of the need to facilitate 
meritorious civil rights litigation and of the resource -disparities 
among litigants, permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys' 
254 See Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241, at 964; cf. Marek, 473 U.S. at 32-33 
(Brennan, j ., dissenting) (criticizing majority's application of Rule 68 because it would 
have similar effects). Critics maintained that these problems could dissuade public inter-
est litigants from commencing suits or lead them to settle prematurely for inadequate 
relief, chilling effects in direct contravention of Congressional policies reflected in fee-
shifting statutes. See Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra, at 962-65; Simon, supra note 241, at 
14-16. Many other criticisms were lodged at the proposal. Some critics asserted that the 
process values inherent in public law cases are so important that the judiciary should not 
attempt to influence settlement in these suits in any way. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra 
note 55, at 1085-90; Simon, supra, at 65-68, 75, 85; cf. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 672 (1986) ("wholly inappropriate" to 
resolve "public law disputes in ADR systems that are totally divorced from courts"). 
255 See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted 
in 102 F.R.D. 430, 432-37 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Proposal]. See also Simon, supra note 
24 l, at 16-19, 28-53 (helpful analysis of the 1984 proposal). 
256 See 1984 Proposal, supra note 255, 102 F.R.D. at 433. 
257 See supra notes 196-236 and accompanying text. 
258 For example, although the 1984 proposal placed more discretion in the judiciary 
with explicitly enumerated factors to guide the discretion's exercise, those changes did 
not necessarily afford public interest litigants greater certainty. See Simon, supra note 
24 l, at 28-53 (thorough critique of the specific features of the 1984 version). 
259 See id. at 18-19, 40-44. 
260 473 U.S. 1 (1985). For analysis of Marek and its implications, see Macklin, Pro-
moting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575 (l 986); Simon, 
The New Meaning of Rule 68: Marek v. Chesny and Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 475 (1986). 
261 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (l 982). 
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fees from defendants. The Supreme Court majority found that Rule 
68 "costs" included attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Fees Act 
and under other fee-shifting legislation which define costs to en-
compass such fees. Thus, "civil rights plaintiffs-along with other 
plaintiffs who reject" offers more favorable than their eventual re-
covery at trial will not be entitled to attorneys' fees for services ren-
dered after they reject such offers.262 The Court maintained that 
"merely subjecting" those who pursue civil rights cases to Rule 68's 
settlement provision would not "curtail their access to the courts or 
significantly deter" them from filing actions while declaring neutral 
the Rule's "clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits."263 
The majority acknowledged that the application of Rule 68 in this 
context would require civil rights "plaintiffs to 'think very hard' 
about whether continued litigation is worthwhile. " 264 Nevertheless, 
the Court found this effect of the Rule compatible with policies re-
flected in fee-shifting statutes because under those measures the de-
gree of success secured is the most significant determinant in 
awarding fees. 255 · 
Justice Brennan's dissent identified numerous possible adverse 
implications of the majority's reading of Rule 68 for public law liti-
gation and public interest litigants.266 He criticized the majority for 
employing Rule 68's mechanical approach which merely compares 
the defendant's offer and the plaintiff's judgment. The majority's 
substitution of that rigid formulation for the Civil Rights Fees Act's 
discretionary inquiry into what is a reasonable fee in light of all per-
tinent considerations-an undertaking characterized as "acutely 
sensitive to the merits of an action and to antidiscrimination pol-
icy"267-inevitably would "require the disallowance of some fees 
that otherwise would have passed muster."268 Justice Brennan as-
serted that interpreting the existing Rule to encompass attorneys' 
fees would create numerous skewed incentives to settle which di-
rectly conflict with the intent of Congress:269 that "private attorneys 
general," who seek "vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights 
262 Marek, 473 U.S. at 14. 
263 Id. at 10. 
264 Id. at I I. 
265 See id. 
266 Id. at 15. Justice Brennan reiterated a number of the criticisms directed at the 
two advisory committee proposals because the effects of their adoption would have re-
sembled those of the majority opinion. 
267 Id. at 29 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980)). 
268 Marek, 473 U.S. at 30. For example, the plaintiff that recovered "only slightly 
less than the proposed amount in settlement" would be automatically prevented from 
recouping fees, even if plaintiff had secured" 'excellent results' in litigation that [would] 
have far-reaching benefit to the public interest." Id. 
269 Id. at 33-34. 
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legislation" and appear "before the court cloaked in a mantle of 
public interest," not "be deterred from bringing good faith actions 
to vindicate" fundamental civil rights.210 
One helpful example of the chilling effect and uncertainty that 
could be engendered by the majority's approach is afforded in the 
dissent's reference to the existing Rule's ten day time limit on ac-
ceptance or rejection of settlement offers.271 This time limit en-
courages a defendant who has violated the law to make low offers 
early in the litigation before a plaintiff can secure through discovery 
the requisite information to evaluate the strength of the case and the 
offer's reasonableness. These factors could force the plaintiff to ac-
cept an inadequate settlement, without being able to make an in-
formed judgment, because of the great risk of having to assume 
automatically all post-offer attorneys' fees.272 
The extant Rule's requirement that courts ascertain whether 
plaintiff's judgment was more favorable than defendant's settlement 
offer provides an equally troubling example. Defendants typically 
phrase settlement offers in monetary terms. Public interest litigant 
plaintiffs generally seek non-pecuniary, injunctive, or declaratory re-
lief holding that certain procedures, practices, or policies of the de-
fendant violate the Constitution or a .statute. Monetary damages 
may be insignificant or irrelevant to these plaintiffs. Thus, judges 
will have to perform the complex tasks of quantifying any non-
pecuniary relief that a plaintiff secures and of comparing it to de-
fendant's monetary settlement offer. Justice Brennan observed that 
the "uncertainty in making such assessments surely will add pres-
sures on a plaintiff to settle his suit even if by doing so he abandons 
an opportunity to obtain potentially far-reaching non-monetary re-
lief-a discouraging incentive entirely at odds. with Congress' 
intent. " 273 
The Supreme Court's reading of Rule 68 could inhibit public 
interest litigants and public law litigation. The majority's interpre-
tation, by producing uncertainty regarding attorney fee awards, may 
adversely affect public interest litigants, because their relative lack of 
resources makes them risk averse. Even if the litigants are not de-
270 Id. at 32 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 252, at 4-5 (1976) and H.R. REP. No. 
158, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976)). 
271 Marek, 473 U.S. at 32. 
272 Id. at 32 n.48. 
273 Id. Indeed, the Marek majority's use of a monetary example to illustrate its rea-
soning may evince indifference to these problems as well as a lack of appreciation for the 
significance of non-monetary relief. See id. at 11. The Court recently has, however, ex-
hibited concern about the difficulties and appreciation for the importance of non-mone-
tary relief. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 
1486, 1492-94 (1989); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 945 (1989). 
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terred from commencing suits, they may feel constrained to settle 
prematurely. This interpretation could chill precisely that type of 
activity which Congress sought to promote by enacting fee-shifting 
legislation: the institution, and vigorous pursuit, of litigation seek-
ing to enforce civil rights statutes, to vindicate important principles, 
public policies, and values which are not readily reducible to mone-
tary form, and to challenge violations of the Constitution and 
statutes.274 · 
The Supreme Court has similarly applied other Rules which im-
plicate litigation financing. In Evans v. Jeff D., 275 the Supreme Court 
analyzed the interrelation of the Fees Act and Rule 23(e), which re-
quires judicial approval of decisions to compromise, dismiss, or set-
tle class action litigation.276 The Court's ruling allowed trial judges 
to approve settlements conditioned on plaintiffs' agreement to 
waive their attorneys' fees.277 The majority relied partially on 
Marek's explicit rejection of the argument that civil rights cases 
ought to be treated differently from other civil suits for settlement 
purposes278 while observing that preclusion of fee waivers could 
have the effect of "forcing more cases to trial, unnecessarily burden-
ing the judicial system, and disserving civil rights litigants."279 
Justice Brennan, again in dissent, echoed some of the concerns 
he articulated in Marek and raised certain others. 280 He stated that 
274 In a recent "case of first impression," a district judge stated that plaintiff, over 
defendant's vigorous opposition, established that the "long standing practice of Phila-
delphia's police officers ... of engaging in warrantless searches ofliquor licensed estab-
lishments, was unconstitutional," and commended counsel for achieving an 
"outstanding level of success." Nonetheless, plaintiff, who rejected a $15,000 settle-
ment offer and recovered a jury verdict of $740, was denied post-offer attorneys' fees. 
See Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 700 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Several 
circuits have found that Rule 68 does not require prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to pay 
defendants' post-offer attorneys' fees. See O'Brien v. City of Greer's Ferry, 873 F.2d 
1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333-34 (1st Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). See generally Macklin, supra note 260 (discussing 
post-Marek judicial application of Rule 68); Simon, supra note 260 (same). 
275 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
276 FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e). This provision states: 
Id. 
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the ap-
proval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise 
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court 
directs. 
277 475 U.S. at 737-38 ("It is not necessary to construe the Fees Act as embodying a 
general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the waiver of fees in order to be 
faithful to the purposes of that Act.") 
278 Id. at 732. 
279 Id. at 736-37. The Court did acknowledge, however, "that decisions by individ-
ual clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, dimin-
ish lawyers' expectations of statutory fees in civil rights cases." Id. at 741 n.34. 
280 See id. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
1989] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 317 
allowing negotiated fee waivers would contravene Congress' pur-
pose of providing economic incentives to attract competent attor-
neys for victims of civil rights violations who otherwise could not 
afford lawyers, thereby enabling the potential plaintiffs to act as 
"'private attorneys general,' vindicating the public interest."281 
Permitting civil rights defendants to condition settlement on a 
waiver of statutory attorneys' fees would diminish lawyers' expecta-
tions of recovering fees and their willingness to represent civil rights 
plaintiffs, making it more difficult for victims of discrimination to 
secure counsel. 282 These disadvantages could result, because fee 
waivers actually will affect lawyers alone. Most potential plaintiffs 
lack funds to pay attorneys' fees, so lawyers must rely exclusively on 
the Fees Act for remuneration. Plaintiffs, however, have no incen-
tive to seek statutory fees and, therefore, may waive them in return 
for substantive relief. Justice Brennan cautioned that defendants 
will routinely demand fee waivers in future offers to settle civil rights 
cases and that the cumulative impacts of this practice would be to 
reduce the number of lawyers willing to accept civil rights cases and 
to make it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to secure coun-
sel. 283 Thus, Evans and Marek might have certain synergistic effects: 
potential plaintiffs will file fewer civil rights cases, while the already 
miniscule percentage of suits tried will decline.284 
281 Id. at 745. 
282 Id. at 754-55. 
283 Id. at 758-59. But cf. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 586 n.4 (1986) 
(Powell, J ., concurring) (aware of no empirical study showing aggrieved persons have 
difficulty securing counsel in civil rights cases). 
284 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 532. Additional recent Supreme Court cases on attor-
neys' fees that do not involve the Federal Rules could have adverse efi"ects on public 
interest litigation profound as those of Marek or Evans. See, e.g., International Federation 
ofFlight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989) (prevailing Title VII plaintiff 
can only recover attorneys' fees against intervenor whose "action was frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or without foundation"). Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202 (1988) (summary 
reversal of attorney's fee award because civil rights plaintiff cannot be prevailing party 
when case rendered moot); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (multipliers of lode star fee to compen-
sate for assuming risk of loss impermissible under typical fee-shifting statute and specifi-
cally inappropriate in litigation under the Clean Air Act to enforce consent decree). 
The Court has evinced somewhat greater solicitude for public interest litigants in 
other fee cases. See, e.g., Missouri v.jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (eleventh amend-
ment does not proscribe enhancement of fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against state 
to compensate for delayed payment); Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independ-
ent School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989) (rejection ofrequirement that civil rights 
plaintiff must win litigation's central issue to be prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 944 (1989) (contingent fee contract 
does not impose automatic ceiling on civil rights plaintiff's attorneys' fee award under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court's ambivalence has been exacerbated by a clear lack of 
solicitude in other substantive and procedural rulings in the civil rights and employment 
discrimination areas issued just this term. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. 
Ct. 2363 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T, lnc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. 
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The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Crawford Fitting Co. v. 
]. T. Gibbons, Inc. 285 could have some similar, albeit more limited, im-
pacts. In Crawford Fitting, the Court held that the federal courts lack 
discretion under Rule 54(d)286 to award prevailing parties expert 
witness fees that exceed the thirty dollars per day prescription in-
cluded in Section 1821 of Tide 28 of the United States Code.287 
Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that the majority's approach 
contradicted Rule 54(d)'s language and history. He· also contended 
that its ruling was "ill-advised as a policy matter," because victori-
ous litigants, who have incurred great expense due to the "unavoid-
able necessity of [procuring] expert witness testimony to establish 
or rebut" legal claims, should be able to invoke judicial discretion to 
recover such cost.288 This rationale applies with special force to 
most public interest litigants, who have more need for, and less abil-
ity to pay, such experts than most litigants. Public interest litigants 
may lack scientific or technical information that the government 
has289 or may lack the "in-house" expert capabilities that industry 
possesses. 290 
In sum, the Supreme Court's application of these three Rules 
implicating litigation financing could detrimentally affect public in-
terest litigants and may chill public law litigation. It is too early to 
ascertain the ultimate effects of the Court's rulings.291 Certain con-
siderations, such as why individuals and attorneys choos·e to forgo 
suit, are very difficult to document. Nonetheless, it does appear that 
uncertainty generated by Marek and disincentives fostered by Evans 
may have deterred potential plaintiffs from undertaking public law 
Ct. 2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); City of 
Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). But see Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 
285 482 U.S. 437 (1987). 
286 FED. R. C1v. P. 54(d) ("costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party" 
except when expressly provided for by statute). 
287 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) states, "a witness shall be paid an attendance fee of$30 
per day .... " 
288 Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 450. 
289 See supra note 238. Environmental public interest litigation provides a typical 
example. 
290 Most mass tort and sophisticated product liability litigation as well as much em-
ployment discrimination litigation require substantial "outside" expertise. It is interest-
ing to note that the companion case in Crawford Fitting involved an employer's request 
for $11,807 in witness fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs who alleged racial discrimina-
tion. See Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439. 
291 In Evans, 475 U.S. at 765-66, Justice Brennan, in dissent, offered several 
remedial suggestions, including the possibility of Congressional action. Cf Phillips v. 
Allegheny County, 869 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1989) (suggesting that if civil rights de-
fendants abuse Rule 23(e), plaintiffs should timely raise with district judges who can 
employ managerial judging); N. ARON, supra note 1, at 129 (urging amendment because 
of adverse impacts on public interest litigants of Evans and i'Jarek). 
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litigation.292 Moreover, some district and circuit judges rely upon 
Crawford Fitting to limit witness fee awards even in civil rights cases 
when fees are sought pursuant to fee-shifting legislation. 293 Thus, 
as experience accumulates with lower federal courts' application of 
these Rules and with the practices of lawyers, parties, and potential 
litigants under the Rules, it should become easier to discern any ad-
verse impacts on public interest litigants.294 
4. The Party joinder Amendments with Special Reference to Federal 
Rules 19 and 24 
The Federal Rules' party joinder provisions appear in Rule 19 
(covering compulsory party joinder), Rule 23 (governing class ac-
tions) and Rule 24 (regarding intervention).295 All three were in-
cluded in the original 1938 Rules, and each was revised significantly 
in 1966. 296 This subsection will assess judicial application of Rules 
19 and 24 in greater depth. Rule 19 is one of the few Rules that 
courts have applied in a way that clearly benefits public interest liti-
gants, although such application has been problematic. Most public 
interest litigation today involves requests to intervene under Rule 
24 filed by regnlated entities, public interest litigants, or the govern-
ment. Correspondingly, Rule 23 has engendered such controversy 
since 1966 that analysis of its judicial implementation may not yield 
trustworthy conclusions. Nevertheless, this subsection will treat 
Rule 23's application briefly. 
a. Federal Rule 19. Rule 19 governs compulsory joinder of parties. 
2~2 These assertions are gleaned from conversations with public interest litigants. 
For a sense of the post-Marek difficulties that can arise under Rule 68, see Spencer v. 
General Electric Co., 706 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-44 (E.D. Va. 1989); Lawrence v. City of 
Philadelphia, 700 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Cf. Phillips, 869 F.2d at 235-40 
(same as to post-Evans difficulties under Rule 23(e)). But cf. id. at 239 (not come to 
court's attention that civil rights defendants have persisted in demanding fee waivers). 
293 See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1989); Glenn v. 
General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1575 (I Ith Cir. 1988); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 
833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987); Central Delaware Branch, NAACP v. City of Dover, 
123 F.R.D. 85, 94-95 (D. Del. 1988). 
294 For example, numerous civil rights attorneys apparently have been able to avoid 
the potential effects of Evans by following justice Brennan's suggestion that they "obtain 
agreements from their clients not to waive attorney's fees." Evans, 475 U.S. at 766. 
Recent theoretical work shows that fee-shifting can disproportionately affect those who 
are risk averse. See, e.g., Rowe & Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Prelim-
inary Report, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. (forthcoming 1988); Rowe, Predicting the Effects of 
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 139, 164-70 (1984). 
295 See FED. R. C1v. P. 19, 23 and 24. See generally Bone, supra note 3 (helpful analysis 
of their histories); Kaplan, supra note 46 (same). 
296 See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. LJ. 1204 (1966); cf. 
Kaplan, supra note 46 (Reporter's analysis of original Rules, ostensible reasons for 
amendment, and revisions made). 
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The Rule asks whether absentees-individuals or entities not m1-
tially made parties to the litigation-should be added to ensure a 
fair resolution of the case.297 Absentees are needed for just adjudi-
cation when the entities have an interest in the suit that could be 
adversely affected by resolution without them or when continuing 
without them could detrimentally affect those already parties.298 
When a court determines that an absentee is needed for just adjudi-
cation, the judge must ascertain whether joinder is' feasible, an in-
quiry which entails consideration of subject matter jurisdiction, 
service of process and venue. 299 If the court finds joinder feasible, 
the absentee "shall be joined as a party in the action."3 oo When 
joinder is infeasible, the court must decide whether in "equity and 
good conscience" the plaintiff's case should proceed without absen-
tees or should be dismissed.301 The considerations explicitly pro-
vided in Rule I9(b) guide this determination: the plaintiff's need 
for a forum in which to pursue relief, the potential for prejudice to 
absentees' interests if the litigation continues without them, the de-
fendant's concern that it not be exposed to multiple or inconsistent 
suits or responsibilities, and the interest of the public in efficacious 
resolution of controversies as well as additional factors that may be 
relevant to equity and good conscience. 30 2 
Much public interest litigation implicates Rule 19. For exam-
ple, the Sierra Club recently challenged the National Park Service's 
procedures for issuing permits to mine in Alaska's national parks; 
the Club did not sue miners who had already secured permits. 30 3 A 
substantive decision favorable to the Sierra Club could have jeop-
ardized these miners' interests. The litigation raised two questions 
under Rule 19: first, did the Rule require that the absentee miners 
be brought into the litigation because their joinder was feasible?; 
and second, if joinder were not feasible, should the Sierra Club's 
297 See generally Freer, Rethinking Compulsory joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal 
Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1985) (analysis of Rule 19 from a private law perspec-
tive); Tobias, supra note 77 (analysis from a public law perspective). 
298 Factors relevant to ascertaining whether absentees are needed for just adjudica-
tion are in subsections 19(a)(l), (a)(2)(i) and (ii). See Tobias, supra note 77, at 774-78 & 
nn.144-77 (analysis of these factors and their application). 
299 FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a);seeTobias, supra note 77, at 778-79 & nn.178-80 (analysis of 
the ''.joinder limitations"). 
300 FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). 
301 FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b); see Tobias, supra note 77, at 779-92 & nn.181-255 (analysis 
of that decision). 
302 See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b). The characterization of the stated considerations is 
derived from the Supreme Court's formulation in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). See Tobias, supra note 77, at 779-92 & 
nn.181-255 (analysis of factors relevant to equity and good conscience). 
303 See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No.]85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Ala.July 24, 
1985), ajf"d on other grounds, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986). 
I989] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 32I 
claim proceed without the absentees or should it be dismissed? The 
judge who tried this case, and courts hearing numerous other public 
law suits, have resolved these difficult party joinder issues by creat-
ing a "public rights exception."304 
The public rights exception affords public interest litigants a fo-
rum in which to vindicate public rights by allowing plaintiffs' suits to 
continue without requiring joinder of absentees whose interests 
could be adversely affected by resolution in their absence. An im-
portant concomitant of the exception's application, however, has 
been the dearth of judicial concern for absentees' interests-inter-
ests that can be prejudiced substantially. In the worst case scenario, 
courts may have adjudicated absentees' interests without their hav-
ing notice of the litigation.3°5 In public law cases pursued during 
the last several years, large numbers of absentees, which had in-
vested significant sums on preparing for contemplated natural re-
source exploration and development in reliance on governmental 
representations that the exploration and development were proper, 
were not ordered joined at the trial court level.306 When public in-
terest litigants convinced trial judges of the impropriety of govern-
mental activity pertaining to absentee exploration and development, 
the courts effectively halted those operations. Accordingly, absen-
tees have had to expend substantial resources on protracted litiga-
tion and even may lose all of their investments on exploration and 
development, should their contentions ultimately be rejected. 307 
Thus, federal judges have applied a public rights exception 
which facilitates public interest litigants' pursuit of their cases. Fed-
eral courts, out of apparent solicitude for plaintiffs' forum needs-a 
concern clearly and strongly expressed in Rule I9(b)-may have ne-
glected an equally explicit and weighty concern in the same subsec-
tion, minimization of prejudice to absentees.308 Even when judges 
304 See id. See also Tobias, supra note 77, at 759-60 & nn.75-76 (listing cases in which 
the exception was applied) and at 759-69 & nn.75-123 (analysis of judicial articulation of 
the exception). The classic formulation which appears in half the opinions is: "when 
litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third persons who may be adversely 
affected by a decision fuvorable to the plaintiff do not thereby become indispensable 
parties." See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting 
Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
305 See Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 275-77, aff'd on rehearing, 676 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (D.D.C. 
1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
306 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford (absentees allegedly invested millions of dollars explor-
ing for oil and gas on public lands which they may be unable to recoup). 
307 The Ninth Circuit's "modification" of the district court's order apparently was an 
attempt to be responsive to these considerations in Conner v. Burford. See 836 F.2d at 
1541. 
308 Most courts justify their application of the exception by appeals to public policy, 
such as governmental accountability for decisionmaking. See, e.g., id. at 1540-41 (con-
322 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:270 
applying the public rights exception appear to resolve properly the 
compulsory party joinder question, it remains difficult to ascertain 
positively whether the courts correctly conducted the inquiry envi-
sioned by Rule 19. 309 The uncertainty created by unclear judicial 
treatment has hampered absentees' planning while engendering 
prolonged litigation, wasting scarce private and public resources, 
and eroding the courts' credibility.310 
b. Federal Rule 24( a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) governs non-statutory inter-
vention of right. 311 It provides that, upon submission of a timely 
request, an absentee with a sufficient interest in the "property or 
transaction which is the subject" of the suit that could be adversely 
affected if the case is resolved without it shall be permitted to inter-
vene, unless existing parties adequately represent its interest.312 
Thus, the concept of interest is integral to Rule 24(a)(2); it appears 
cern that "death knell" for ''.judicial review of executive decisionmaking" not sound and 
that two environmental statutes be enforced); cf. Tobias, supra note 77, al 764-65 (dis-
cussion of other justifications). 
309 The difficulties with these cases lie primarily in what courts omitted, as-
sumed, or stated unclearly . . . . Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain 
whether judges followed the rule's steps in resolving the joinder ques-
tion, and a few judges apparently ignored or even violated the rule's ex-
plicit commands. Indeed, it is impossible to discern what some judges 
applying the exception in fact did. 
Tobias, supra note 77, at 769. 
310 These problems do not necessarily mean that judges resolved thejoinder 
issue erroneously. Indeed, a number of courts apparently made correct 
decisions and certainly effectuated rule l9's weighty concern for plain-
tiffs' forum needs. However, the reader of judicial opinions invoking the 
public rights exception cannot positively determine if most of the courts 
reached appropriate conclusions. 
Id. 
As this Article was in press, the Supreme Court issued an opinion interpreting Rule 
19 in ways that could disadvantage public interest litigants. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. 
Ct. 2 ISO (I 989). The Court permitted white firefighters, who claimed that they had 
been adversely affected by a consent decree governing employment practices between 
black firefighters and the City of Birmingham, Alabama, to challenge that decree in sub-
sequent, separate litigation. The Court reasoned that it was preferable to require plain-
tiffs, such as the black firefighters, to join under Rule 19 anyone who could be practicaly 
prejudiced by the litigation, rather than require that absentees intervene under Rule 24. 
It is too early lo discern all of Wilks· potential implications; however, the decision may 
disadvantage public interest litigants by, for instance, requiring that they incur great 
expense identifying and joining large numbers of absentees. 
311 FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2). See general(i· Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before 
Courts, Agencies a11d Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 721 (l 968) (analysis of the Rule princi-
pally from a private law perspective); Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a 
New Methodology of Decisio11making, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 894 (1980) (same); Jones, Litigation 
Without Representation: The .Veedfor Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 3 I (1979) (analysis from a public law perspective). I have not analyzed the 
application to public law litigation of Rule 24(a)(l), governing statutory intervention of 
right, because it is comparatively straightfonvard or of Rule 24(b), governing permissive 
intervention, because it is more discretionary, an easier case, and less instructive. 
312 FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2). 
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explicitly in three requirements and implicates the fourth. The con-
cept of interest is important to public interest litigants because they 
represent large numbers of unorganized people, such as the poor, 
who individually have interests that may appear relatively insubstan-
tial, or they seek to vindicate comparatively intangible interests like 
that of the general public in clean air. 
Much public interest litigation involves issues of intervention of 
right. In the case in which the Sierra Club questioned National Park 
Service procedures for issuing permits to mine in Alaska's national 
parks, the court ordered that the miners holding permits receive no-
tice and an opportunity to request intervention in the apparent be-
lief that they were entitled to intervene as of right in the lawsuit.313 
Correspondingly, public interest litigants often seek to intervene in 
litigation challenging governmental activity pursued by regulated 
entities, like energy companies. 
Numerous courts have technically applied Rule 24(a)(2)'s four 
requirements to intervention requests of both private applicants and 
public interest litigants. Some courts have created presumptions as 
to the requirements' satisfaction or have developed judicial glosses 
on, or tests for, the requirements, which do not appear in the rule's 
text or in the Advisory Committee Note. Such treatment apparently 
reflects the Rule's essentially private law focus and a similar ap-
proach of the courts, which has adversely affected public interest 
litigants, both as plaintiffs and as potential intervenors.314 
Nearly all courts read Rµle 24(a)(2) to require that applicants 
submit timely intervention requests, show that they have the requi-
site interest in the pending litigation, demonstrate that resolution 
without them will impair their interests, and show that existing par-
ties inadequately represent those interests. Moreover, most judges 
demand that prospective intervenors clearly satisfy all four of these 
requirements. 
A number of circuit and district court judges has interpreted 
tec;:hnically or narrowly the interest component of Rule 24(a)(2),315 
313 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
314 When public interest litigants have sought to intervene in suits involving private 
interests and the government, the public interest litig-,mts have enjoyed less success than 
private interests seeking to intervene in litigation public interest litigants have pursued 
against the government. Thus, public interest litigants have lost the opportunity to pro-
tect interests important to them, while the litigation they have brought has been compli-
cated by the entry of absentees. This subsection emphasize5 public interest litigants' 
requests to intervene, because their resolution poses greater difficulty. 
315 FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2). The Rule speaks of an interest "relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action." The very language, "interest in the 
property," bespeaks a private law approach; public interest litigants often seek to vindi-
cal<." something much less tangible and considerably less private, such as a moral or 
aesthetic interest. 
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demanding that potential intervenors have a significant, direct, le-
gally protectable interest.316 Moreover, three Justices of the 
Supreme Court recently subscribed to a similar formulation, stating 
that Rule 24(a)(2)'s "requirement of a 'significantly protectable in-
terest' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some 
degree of legal protection."317 A number of lower federal court 
judges have imposed even more stringent requirements, speaking in 
terms of an interest which the "substantive law recognizes as be-
longing to or being owned by applicants"318 or demanding that po-
tential intervenors possess interests equal to, or exceeding, that 
required for standing.319 
Two recent Seventh Circuit opinions ilh,1strate these restrictive 
approaches. One case involved an action brought by the United 
States to condemn private property for inclusion in the Congressio-
nally authorized Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. 320 The court 
denied intervention to a public interest group-with a thirty-year 
commitment to the creation of the Lakeshore, whose members had 
lobbied successfully for the legislation and used the area and which 
asserted that the government had abandoned acquisition efforts-
because the organization lacked the only two legal interests the 
court treated as relevant in eminent domain proceedings.321 The 
court stated: 
While the Council's aesthetic and environmental interest in Cres-
316 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 
463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Moria! v. United Gas Pipe Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) 
(Rule 24(a)(2) requires a direct, significant, legally protectable interest in property or 
transaction subject of the action); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 
1982) (intervention of right requires direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in 
proceeding); Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(intervention prohibited when interest founded on what potential intervenors regard as 
enlightened public policy not legally protectable interest in contract at issue). 
317 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring, 
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Burger). 
318 Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (I Ith Cir. 
1982); accord Heyman v. Exchange Nat'! Bank of Chicago, 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
319 See United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, sub. nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) 
(exceeding standing); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 
777. 779 (1984) (equal to standing). Cf Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 
(11th Cir. 1989) (if justiciable case and controversy between parties, applicant need not 
demonstrate standing, although standing cases relevant to defining type of interest must 
assert). See generally Diamond v. Charles, 4 76 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (reserving for future 
decision question whether potential intervenor initially must satisfy standing). 
320 See 36.96 Acres of Land 754 F.2d 855. 
321 "An eminent domain proceeding ... considers only two legal interests. The first 
interest is that of the sovereign to exercise the power of eminent domain . . . . The 
second interest in an eminent domain proceeding is one of private ownership-essen-
tially the ownership of the condemned property." 754 F.2d at 858. 
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cent Dune may indeed be legitimate and demonstrable, we cannot 
say that it is direct, substantial or legally protectable. Therefore, 
the Council's interest in ("guaranteeing the preservation of [Cres-
cent Dune's] natural beauty,") ... for public use is not the type of 
interest which justifies intervention under Rule 24(a).3 22 
325 
In the second case, 323 a public interest organization sought to vindi-
cate its interest in the protection of "unborn" children and its 
"members' interest in adopting fetuses 'born alive' after abor-
tions."324 The group had been instrumental in seairing legislation 
favorable to its views. The circuit court found that the group lacked 
a "direct and substantial interest sufficient to support intervention" 
in litigation challenging the legislation's constitutionality.325 The 
court revealed its private law approach by flatly rejecting the propo-
sition that the "interest factor must be broadly construed in public 
law cases where public interest organizations seek intervention"326 
and by concomitantly observing that "Rule 24(a) precludes a con-
ception of lawsuits, even 'public law' suits, as necessary forums for 
such public policy debates" as those over abortion.327 
The second intervention requirement asks whether the "action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede" the prospective inter-
venor's ability to protect its interest if the case proceeds in the appli-
cant's absence.328 Much of the above analysis of the interest 
requirement applies here. For example, the type of general, collec-
tive, or intangible "public" interests-like those in environmental 
quality or wilderness preservation-which public interest litigants 
typically champion, will less likely appear prejudiced as a practical 
matter than an individual, palpable, "private" interest, such as that 
in a contract. Thus, even when judges read the impairment require-
ment rather flexibly, finding sufficient the potential stare decisis effect 
of a judgment in an applicant's absence, that interpretation benefits 
public interest litigants less than those representing private 
interests. 329 
Rule 24(a)(2)'s third condition requires potential intervenors to 
322 Id. at 859. 
323 See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois Pro-Life 
Coalition v. Keith, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). 
324 764 F.2d at 1271. 
325 Id. at 1269. 
326 Id. at 1268. 
327 Id. at 1270. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 
146-48 (7th Cir. 1989) (recent summarization of Seventh Circuit jurisprudence). 
328 See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2). 
329 Cases permitting intervention by private interests because industry members sat-
isfy the practical prejudice condition are more the rule. Correspondingly, decisions al-
lowing intervention by public interest litigants because they have met the requirement 
are more the exception. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978) and Natural Resources Defense 
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demonstrate that parties to the litigation do not adequately repre-
sent their interests. 330 A number of courts has been more willing to 
find the government a sufficient representative of public interest liti-
gants than of private interests. The most stringent test, applied by 
some judges, requires that prospective intervenors, with purposes 
similar to the government litigant, prove collusion between the gov-
ernment litigant and other parties to the case, prove nonfeasance on 
the part of the government, or prove adversity of interest between 
the applicant for intervention and the government.331 Numerous 
courts employ a presumption of adequacy when one party is a gov-
ernmental entity responsible for representing the public, the public 
interest, or interests of the potential intervenor.332 Moreover, a 
growing number of judges has premised the determination of ade-
quacy of representation on the notion of the parens patriae developed 
in other contexts-the government is assumed to represent the in-
terests of all citizens of the state. 333 Application of the parens patriae 
label, however, begs the question of adequacy of representation. 
The terminology and results in several recent cases reveal the detri-
mental impact on public interest litigants of the application re-
viewed and unclear judicial thinking. In those decisions, judges 
found that the government would be a sufficient representative of 
public interest litigants that sought to champion "public interests," 
but the courts indicated or implied that the government could not 
adequately represent "private interests" asserted by others, such as 
industry.334 · 
Intervention's fourth requirement is timeliness. Rule 24(a)(2) 
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. 
Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). 
330 See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2). 
331 See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1982); Liddell v. 
Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). 
332 See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Keith, 764 F.2d at 1270; cf. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 
1982) (applying this presumption and the test appearing in the text accompanying note 
331 supra); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11. 16-17, 26 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (same). 
333 See generally United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984-
87 (2d Cir. 1984) (clear, comprehensive exposition of the parens patriae notion, as devel-
oped in other contexts, and a thorough compilation of cases). 
334 See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d at 144 (government adequate 
representative of public interest group because group "asserts essentially the public in-
terest rather than a personal interest" but inadequate to protect the interest of "private 
proprietors"); cf. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1270 (public interest litigant's assertion of essentially 
"personal" interests insufficient to intervene); Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 
700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (public interest litigant's interest founded on "enlight-
ened public policy" insufficient to intervene). Courts have occasionally found the gov-
ernment an adequate representative of private interests. See, e.g., Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 834 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
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merely states "upon timely application," and the Advisory Commit-
tee Note is silent on what timeliness means.335 Nonetheless, many 
courts have embellished the requirement by developing four factors 
to consider in determining whether application is timely: 
(1) the length of time the prospective intervenor knew or reason-
ably should have known of its interests before it petitioned to in-
tervene, (2) the prejudice to existing parties due to the failure to 
petition for intervention promptly, (3) the prejudice ~he prospec-
tive intervenor would suffer if not allowed to intervene, and (4) 
the existence of any unusual circumstances militating either for or 
against intervention. 336 
The development and application of the four considerations ad-
versely affect public interest litigants. For example, private inter-
ests, such as regulated entities, have considerable time and money 
to monitor governmental activity that affects their interests, so they 
will know about litigation important to them. In contrast, the re-
source constraints of public interest litigants make it less likely that 
they will be aware oflitigation implicating their interests and even if 
they are, it may be impossible to ascertain whether the relief entered 
will affect them. Indeed, public interest litigants have not learned of 
litgation's institution in certain cases involving compelling substan-
tive issues, such as affirmative action,337 
In short, the treatment of requests to intervene as of right 
335 FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a)(2); FED. R. ClV. P. 24, advisory committee note, reprinted in 
39 F.R.D. 109 (1966); see Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention of Right, 89 YALE LJ. 
586 (1980) (analysis of timeliness). 
336 United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d at 143-44; accord Grubbs v. Norris, 870 
F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1989); Stallwonh v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. 
United Air Lines, 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975). Judicial development of the four 
factors and others may be justified on the basis of the Supreme Court's admonition that 
a trial court's timeliness determination is to be premised on consideration of "all the 
circumstances." NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973). Nonetheless, it is un-
clear why these factors were developed, when the Advisory Committee explicitly in-
cluded some of them in Rule 24(b). Moreover, the factors essentially ask couns to 
reexamine cenain matters that they expressly considered under the initial three require-
ments of Rule 24(a)(2) or were implicated in that treatment. This reexamination is par-
ticularly detrimental to public interest litigants, for example, because the nature of the 
interests they represent will make the interests themselves and prejudice to those inter-
ests appear insignificant, especially in contrast to other interests, such as industry 
interests. 
337 See Jones, supra note 311, at 43, 79-86 (cogent analysis of this problem in the 
affirmative action context); BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 30, at ch. 4 (discussion of 
the resource constraints). For helpful, recent examples of the timeliness problems that 
can arise in related types of public law litigation, see United States v. City of Chicago, 
870 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1989); Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 345-46; Chiles, 865 F.2d at 
1213. lronically, the Supreme Court recently intimated that public interest litigants 
might file subsequent, separate suits challenging consent decrees resolving litigation in 
which they did not intervene. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). 
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under Rule 24(a)(2) reflects the private law phrasing of the provi-
sion and concomitant judicial thinking. Despite the admonitions of 
two of this nation's pre-eminent jurists, who advocated flexible, 
pragmatic application of Rule 24 to "other than traditional litiga-
tion, "338 some judges have applied the Rule to public law litigation 
as if it were private litigation, while a number of courts has em-
ployed narrow, technical, or rigid approaches, creating unwarranted 
presumptions, glosses, or tests.339 Judicial opinions offer relatively 
few explicit justifications for these interpretations, although courts 
may want to temper the litigation explosion, to achieve efficiency or 
to manage more effectively complex litigation, by limiting the 
number of parties. 340 
Such judicial treatment has had numerous adverse implications 
for public interest litigants. The relative ease with which those that 
represent "private" interests have gained access to public interest 
litigants' cases has complicated the litigants' ability to control their 
suits, and has increased their costs by delaying resolution of 
daims.341 More importantly, the comparative difficulty that public 
interest litigants have encountered seeking intervention has had sig-
nificant effects. When courts reject these entities' requests to inter-
vene, the potential parties forfeit the valuable opportunity to 
participate in litigation that could adversely affect interests they con-
sider significant, with concomitant losses in governmental accounta-
338 United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 
1984) (Judge Friendly's recent admonition and example of flexible, pragmatic applica-
tion); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699-704 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Judge Leventhal's simi-
lar treatment). 
·339 Such treatment appears attributable substantially to the Rule's private Jaw focus 
and concomitant judicial application. This does not necessarily mean that the results 
reached were incorrect or imply that the Rule was applied improperly, although these 
could be expected given the numerous grounds on which denial of intervention can be 
premised. Moreover, some courts, such as the ninth circuit, have applied Rule 24 in 
ways that are more responsive to public interest litigants. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. 
Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308-10 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 
637-39 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 825-29 (9th Cir. 
1986), rcv'd on other grounds sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 
U.S. 370 (1987); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 417-20 (D. Minn. 
1972). 
340 For discussion of these and other justifications, see Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. 
Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 530-34 (7th Cir. 1988); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 21-23 
(E.D. Tex. 1982). For additional reasons, see supra notes 320-27 and accompanying 
text. 
341 An "intervention of right ... may be subject to appropriate conditions or restric-
tions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the pro-
ceedings." FED. R. Civ. P. 24, advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. at 111. Such 
restrictions are rarely imposed on "private" intervenors. See Stringfellow, 480 U.S. at 380, 
381-83 (Brennan,J., concurring) (analysis of implications of restrictions for intervenors 
of right); PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE, COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" LITI-
GATION chs. 7, 23 (1978) (discussion of public interest litigants' costs). 
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bility and in public acceptance of governmental activity.342 In some 
circumstances, particular individuals or entities may be wholly un-
represented, while certain viewpoints may remain unarticulated. 
The denial of these intervention applications may deprive the fed-
eral judiciary of information, arguments, or perspectives it needs to 
make the best decisions. The considerations have special signifi-
cance when the courts perform the exceedingly complex and deli-
cate task of fashioning relief in institutional re(orm litigation, 
requiring the input and cooperation of all affected people, groups, 
and entities.343 Judges are generalists, and courts and government 
litigants may not have adequate resources or the requisite expertise 
in certain fields, such as science or economics. Moreover, the gov-
ernment has no monopoly on what constitutes the public interest or 
on how to represent it most effectively in specific contexts. Indeed, 
the Rule as written, and as applied by a number of courts, may re-
flect an increasingly impoverished vision of considerable recent fed-
eral civil litigation and perhaps what it should represent in a modem 
democratic society. 344 
342 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452; 
473-75 (5th Cir.) (Williams,]., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Moria! v. United Gas Pipe 
Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (in litigation deciding how much consumers will pay for 
electricity, consumers "must be allowed to participate [because] potent impact upon 
them"); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986) (Na-
tional Park Service admitted violating National Environmental Policy Act and own regu-
lations when approving mining in Alaska's national parks). For analysis of public 
accountability for and the acceptability of government decisions, see Cramton, The Why, 
Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L. J. 572 
(1973); Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 
I403, 1422-24 (1983). 
343 For example, individual institutional members, such as school teachers and 
prison guards, may have the best appreciation of the institutions in which they work and 
be uniquely situated to frustrate practical implementation of decrees by refusing to co-
operate. Indeed, some public law cases involve controversial, and even volatile, issues 
like abortion and school desegregation, as to which emotions run high and there has 
been violence. In those situations, it is especially important to allow those who must 
"live with" the decision an opportunity to participate in its formulation. See Note, Insti-
tutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE LJ. 1474 (1982). 
See also Thornburg, Litigating, the Zero Sum Game: The Effect of Institutional Reform Litigation 
on Absent Parties, 66 OR. L. REV. 843, 877-79 (1987). 
344 For discussion of one vision of considerable recent federal civil litigation, see 
supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. Public values increasingly are the subject of 
acljudication in the modem state, because the courts, like the political branches, may 
provide an important forum for debate on issues of public moment. See Chayes, Public 
Law Litigation, supra note 2; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55. For instance, it now 
could be unfair to relegate public interest entities that have won hard-fought victories in 
the political branches solely to the vicissitudes of government representation of their 
interests in litigation challenging those successes. E.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Illinois Pro-Life Coalition v. Keith, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); 
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985). cert. denied sub nom. 
Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). Indeed, it may be 
disingenuous to so relegate a public interest group that pursued relief from the "polit-
330 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:270 
c. Federal Rule 23. Rule 23, governing class actions, provides that a 
case can proceed as a class suit when the class is so numerous that 
joinder is impracticable, when the potential claims of the class mem-
bers share common characteristics, when the person prosecuting 
the litigation has a claim typical of the class, and when that person is 
an adequate representative of the class members. 345 The class ac-
tion device is the quintessential mechanism for pursuing public law 
litigation. Nonetheless, the class action has had such a checkered 
and controversial career since the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 that 
any attempt to draw conclusions about its judicial application is 
fraught with difficulty.346 Professor Arthur Miller has observed that 
the bench and bar overused and abused class actions during the sec-
ond half of the 1960s, that the period from approximately 1969 to 
1974 witnessed considerable narrowing and some overreaction by 
the courts, and that the subsequent half-decade saw stabilization 
both in attorneys' use and judicial application of the device.347 
Moreover, during the 1980s, there has been a dramatic decrease in 
the number of class action suits filed, most precipitously in the area 
of civil rights. 348 
Judicial narrowing of the mechanism's use, courts' reticence to 
certify class actions, and uncertainty regarding fee awards engen-
dered by cases like Evans, 349 apparently have contributed to this de-
cline.350 Indeed, the Supreme Court's application of Rule 23 in 
certain contexts illustrates the difficulties inherent in following an 
essentially private law approach to the Federal Rules. Professor 
Cha yes has argued that the Court has treated "class representatives 
and members as classical individual claimants" for purposes of ana-
lyzing issues of notice, amount in controversy, authority of repre-
ical" branches of government at judicial instigation or out of the group's possible con-
cern for issues of judicial "equity, comity and federalism. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 
362, 379 (1976). See generally Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563 
(9th Cir. 1983) (public interest litigant's concerns respecting public policy on water use 
"should be addressed to the Executive or Legislative branches"). See also Sunstein, supra 
note 158, at 477 (odd to suggest that regulatory beneficiaries of Congressional statutory 
schemes must return to political process to remedy administrative illegality). 
345 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The class action has inspired voluminous literature. See 
generally s. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
( 1987); Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General· Perspectives from 
an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988); Class Actions and 
Private Attorneys General, 62 IND. LJ. 497 (1987). 
346 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussion of the 1966 amendment); 
Miller, supra note 103 (discussing the controversy over Rule 23); In re A.H. Robins Co., 
Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 729-38 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing controversy). 
347 See Miller, supra note 103, at 676-82. 
348 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
349 Evans v.Jeff. D, 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
350 See Class Actions, supra note 164. 
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sentatives, and standing.351 These rulings may have arbitrarily 
limited operation of the class device as a mechanism for enforcing 
constitutional and statutory policies at the federal and state 
levels.352 Correspondingly, Professor Abraham has stated that the 
Court's Rule 23 interpretations have impeded plaintiffs' efforts to 
invoke it and precluded a "considerable amount of federal class ac-
tion litigation in mass tort cases. "353 
5. A Miscellany of Additional Rules 
Judicial application of several other Rules apparently has ad-
versely affected public interest litigants. The enforcement of the 
Rules-71, 60(b)(5), 52 and 56-will be explored briefly in this 
subsection. 
Rule 71 states that when a court order is entered on behalf of 
someone not a party to the suit, that individual can enforce obedi-
ence to the ruling as if the person had been a party. 354 Certain pub-
lic law litigation, such as school desegregation cases, can implicate 
the Rule when children or parents who did not participate in the 
initial suit assert that the school district is violating a decree entered 
in that litigation. 355 Some judges apparently have applied private 
law rationales when interpreting Rule 71, demanding that those 
who seek to invoke it satisfy requirements relating to standing or 
intervention, thus narrowly restricting the number of persons who 
can pursue relief.356 For example, the fifth circuit rejected a request 
of members of the public, who were not parties to litigation brought 
by the federal government to enforce the Fair Housing Act, that a 
defendant which allegedly violated an order entered in the earlier 
litigation compensate the citizens.357 
351 See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 28 (quotation); id. at 26-45 (remaining ideas 
in sentence). 
352 See id. at 28. In some situations, however, the Court has recognized class actions' 
value as mechanisms for treating "injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of gov-
ernment." See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). Cf. 
Hazard, Fonns of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
628, 640 (1988) (federal courts have treated civil rights class suits more sympathetically 
than small claims damage class suits). 
353 See Abraham, supra note 160, at 877. Accord Mullenix, supra note 160, at 1047-60. 
But cf. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 734 (movement toward Rule 23's more liberal 
use in mass tort context). 
354 See FED. R. C1v. P. 71; see generally Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff's 
Remedy When a Defendant Violates An Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L. F. 971 (thorough treatment 
of Rule 71). 
355 See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1976). 
356 See Rendleman, supra note 354, at 976-78 (analysis of judicial treatment and com-
pilation of relevant cases). 
357 See Northside Realty Assocs. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356-58 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
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Judicial resolution of requests under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify 
consent decrees entered in institutional reform litigation has been 
related in certain respects to courts' application of Rule 71. 358 This 
provision states in pertinent part that courts may relieve parties 
from final judgments, orders, or proceedings if "it is no longer equi-
table that the judgment should have prospective application. "359 
Numerous circuit courts have recently enunciated a standard for al-
tering consent decrees agreed to in institutional reform cases which 
is less rigorous than the requirement imposed in other suits, be-
cause the "unique nature and demands of institutional reform litiga-
tion necessitate a more flexible approach to modification. "360 
These courts state that, although a defendant cannot satisfy the 
longstanding standard of "unforeseen change in circumstances" im-
posed by the Supreme Court in private cases,361 courts may permit 
modification: 
if the defendant (1) can establish some change in circumstances 
has occurred from the time the decree was negotiated and ap-
proved; (2) convince the court that it has attempted to comply 
with the decree in good faith; and (3) asks for a modification that 
does not frustrate the original and overall purpose(s) of the de-
cree .... 362 
Although the complex, delicate nature of institutional reform litiga-
tion may warrant somewhat greater flexibility, application of a less 
358 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); see Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988) (helpful analysis of numerous aspects of consent decrees); 
Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. I (same); cf 
Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. 
I;.. REV. IIOl, 1105, 1119-21, 1148-51 (1986) (modification motions "nominally 
brought" under Rule 60(b)(5) provision which "merely codifies preexisting law" and 
helpful analysis of modification in institutional reform context). 
359 FEo. R. C1v. P. 60(b)(5). 
360 Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 1987); accord Hodge v. Dep't of 
Housing and Urban Dev., 862 F.2d 859, 861-64 (11th Cir. 1989); Plyler v. Evatt, 846 
F.2d 208, 211-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 241 ( 1988); New York State Ass'n for 
Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 
(1983); Massachusetts Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. King, 668 F.2d 602, 607-08 (1st 
Cir. 1981). Cf Twelvejohn Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298-301 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (acknowledging more flexible standard and applying similar factors but en-
forcing them more strictly); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (sug-
gesting more flexible modification standard). 
361 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932);jost,supra note 358, at 
1107-13 (analysis tracing the development of that standard). 
362 Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861 n.8; accord New York State Ass 'n for Retarded Children, 706 F.2d 
at 969-70; Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied sub nom., Thornburgh v. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 444 U.S. 
1026 (1980). The Supreme Court has issued in one case four differing opinions of a 
trial judge's power to alter a "consent decree," although only Justice Blackmun sug-
gested a flexible approach and that was meant to effectuate civil rights litigants' interest. 
See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
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demanding standard means that those who seek institutional reform 
will encounter greater difficulty in securing meaningful relief and 
effective consent decrees, especially in retaining decrees. These 
complications will be exacerbated by the new Supreme Court opin-
ion which permits third parties who have not intervened in employ-
ment discrimination litigation resulting in a consent decree that 
allegedly harms them, to challenge the decree in subsequent, sepa-
rate litigation. 363 
Rule 52(a) provides that "findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-
portunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
ness. "364 The Supreme Court held that the issue of intent to 
discriminate in employment under section 703(h) of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act constitutes a "factual matter subject to the clearly-erro-
neous standard of Rule 52(a)" in Pullman-Standard v. Swint.365 The 
effects of the Court's characterization have been to restrict appellate 
court inquiry into the state of mind of defendants who allegedly dis-
criminate, thereby protecting those accused of discrimination, and 
to limit the procedural opportunities of individuals alleging discrim-
ination, thereby making it more difficult for them to win their 
cases.366 The ultimate impact of the Swint ruling remains unclear, 
although appellate courts have not restricted its application in re-
viewing findings of fact regarding discrimination solely to testimo-
nial evidence or to cases arising under section 703(h) of the Civil 
Rights Act.367 
Rule 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Court~ grant 
these motions when pleadings, interrogatory answers, admissions, 
363 See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). See generally Kramer, supra note 358. 
364 FED. R. C1v. P. 52(a). See Cooper, Civil Rule 52( a): Rationing and Rationalizing the 
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644 (1988) (recent analysis of Rule's 
application); Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 635 (1971) (on appellate review). 
365 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982); see Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52( a): Standards of Appel-
late Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman Standard v. Swint, 58 
TULANE L. REV. 403 (1983) (analysis of Swint); Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 998-
1005 (1984) (same). 
366 See Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 617-19 (1985) (analysis 
contending that those phenomena extend broadly beyond the context of Swint); Resnik, 
supra note 365 at 1004-05 (same). 
367 See Calleros, supra note 365, at 408; Resnik, supra note 365, at l 004. CJ. Scotts v. 
Memphis Fire Dept., 858 F.2d 289, 295-96, 303 (6th Cir. 1988) (appellate court reversal 
of trial judge's factual finding of pattern of intentional discrimination even under Swint's 
dearly erroneous standard). But cf. Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs for East Jefferson 
Levee Dist., 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (appellate court reversal of magis-
trate's factual finding of no intentional discrimination even under Swint standard). See 
also Cooper, supra note 364, at 665-66 (some circuits facilitate more searching review of 
findings of intent to discriminate under dearly erroneous rubric by insisting on detailed 
findings). 
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and affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."368 For many years, the federal courts exhibited considerable 
reluctance to grant summary judgment motions, particularly in com-
plex cases.369 During 1986, however, the Supreme Court en-
couraged the lower federal courts to grant such motions more 
liberally in what has been dubbed the "trilogy"- Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc.,37° Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,371 and Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 372 One writer who surveyed the federal 
judiciary' s application of summary judgment soon after issuance of 
the trilogy had difficulty ascertaining the overall effect of the proce-
dural mechanism's expanded use.373 Nonetheless, her review indi-
cated that courts were granting summary judgment more freely than 
before in certain types of public law cases, especially those involving 
civil rights and employment discrimination. 374 Public interest liti-
gants may be affected adversely by the Court's general suggestion 
that lower federal courts grant summary judgment more readily and 
by the Court's speci(ic failure to separate the idea of predicting the 
trial record from the notion of sufficiency of the evidence.375 The 
368 FED. R. C1v. P. 56(c). 
369 See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 
745-46 (1974); Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary judgment and the Trilogy, 3-11 (unpub-
lished manuscript Nov. 1987). The leading Supreme Court cases contributing to this 
development were Adickes v. S.H. Kress & _Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), and Poller v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). 
370 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
371 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
372 475 U.S. 574 (1986). See Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary judg-
ment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 54 (1988) (helpful look at post-Celotex developments 
in. lower courts and suggestions for future treatment of summary judgment); Risinger, 
Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Ap-
proach to Summary judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35 (1988) (analysis of trilogy especially 
as could be applied to civil rights cases); Vairo, supra note 369, at 15-29 (analysis of the 
trilogy). 
373 See Vairo, supra note 369, at 41. 
374 See id. at 30-40. Professor Vairo listed more cases in each category granting or 
affirming summary judgment than cases denying or reversing it. Of course, the numbers 
were relatively small, so more time must pass before very reliable conclusions can be 
drawn. For a recent example of an appellate court's summary affirmance of a district 
judge's grant of summary judgment against a civil rights plaintiff, see Herrera v. Millsap, 
862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989). Cf Healy v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (appellate panel affirmance of summary judgment in age discrimination case 
over dissent contending improper under Celotex and Anderson). Some courts, such as 
certain panels of the Third Circuit, have been more solicitous of plaintiffs in these cases. 
See, e.g., Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1989); Levendos v. Stem En-
tertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). 
375 As to the general suggestion, Professor Vairo found that most circuit and district 
court judges clearly "have taken the Supreme Court's message to heart" and are "ac-
tively encouraging" summary judgment motions. Vairo, supra note 369, at 30; see, e.g., 
Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 
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Court's conflation of these two concepts could result in a procedure 
which invariably benefits defendants. Regardless of which party 
moves for summary judgment, the plaintiff must tender proof which 
justifies a prediction of the record; this demand requires the plaintiff 
to assemble essentially the entire case and reveal much of that case 
to the defendant, although the defendant has no similar obligation. 
In sum, the federal judiciary' s application of numerous Rules 
has been problematic for public interest litigants. Mqst of this treat-
ment involves the Rules as applied, not written, and poses particular 
difficulties for public interest litigants, often disproportionately af-
fecting them. These judicial interpretations also appear to have had 
cumulative impacts on public law litigation. For example, a numher 
of developments may have the synergistic effect of chilling public 
law suits, especially civil rights cases.376 Although the precise na-
ture of such application and all of its ramifications cannot be dis-
cerned, they are sufficiently clear to support the suggestions for the 
future which follow. 
III 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Preliminary Conclusions and Suggestions for the Short 
Term 
1. Preliminary Conclusions 
Nearly all of the problems for public law litigation and for pub-
lic interest litigants identified involve judicial application of the Fed-
eral Rules, although a few difficulties appear attributable to the 
Rules as written.377 The problems cluster primarily around timing 
932 (1987); see also Risinger, supra note 373 (thorough discussion of the Court's specific 
failure to separate the two concepts). 
376 Judicial application of Rules 8, 11, 68, and 23 could have that effect. Numerous 
other assertions could be posited, especially premised on the material above and the 
preliminary conclusions below, see infra notes 377-78 and accompanying text. This Arti-
cle indicates that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Courts have applied the 
Rules as observed for unclear reasons. Some justifications have been afforded in opin-
ions or seem obvious, such as the litigation explosion. Others, which have not been 
articulated, probably range across a broad spectrum from inadvertence to insensitivity 
and even hostility toward public interest litigants. I certainly do not mean to suggest 
that the federal judiciary systematically set out to eliminate, or even to limit public law 
litigation. All lam saying is that courts applied the vast majority of Rules that I analyzed 
in ways that disadvantaged or disproportionately affected public interest litigants when 
most of the rules were susceptible to multiple, equally plausible interpretations. 
377 For example, the difficulties with Rule 24(a)(2) result both from judicial applica-
tion and the phrasing of the provision. Although flexible application of the Rule as 
written could solve most problems observed, the Rule was widely acknowledged to have 
been "flawed in the amending." See, e.g., Kennedy, Let's Al/join In: Intervention Under 
Rule 24, 57 KY. LJ. 329, 374 (1969); Shapiro, supra note 311, at 757-64; Shreve, supra 
note 311, at 920 n.110; if.Jones, supra note 311, at 48-86 (suggestions for amending rule 
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of acquisition of information, litigation financing, party joinder, and 
remedy formulation. 378 They also implicate issues of judicial case 
management, efficiency, and economy and of attorney responsibility 
as well as notions of "disfavored" litigation and of potential chilling 
effects on public interest litigants. These preliminary conclusions 
prompt a number of recommendations. 
2. Short-Tenn Suggestions 
The federal judiciary, the Advisory Committee, and the Con-
gress should consider numerous short-term recommendations while 
additional information regarding the Rules' application to public 
law litigation is collected, analyzed, and synthesized. The federal 
courts should apply the Rules with greater solicitude for public in-
terest litigants. Apparent judicial insensitivity to these litigants and 
mere inadvertence have created some of the difficulties. Courts 
seemingly have decided issues arising under the Rules that involve 
the litigants in a piecemeal fashion without reflecting on the cumula-
tive impacts of such determinations.379 Judges also have appeared 
more concerned about responding to certain problems, such as the 
litigation explosion or expeditious resolution of complex lawsuits, 
than about disadvantaging public interest litigants. Indeed, some 
courts, in apparent haste to achieve more dispositions or to con-
clude ostensibly "frivolous litigation," may have inadequately con-
sidered other important values, such as affording potential litigants 
an opportunity to be heard. 
Many of the problems created can be ameliorated without 
straining either the language of the Rules or judicial credibility.380 
24 to accommodate public law litigation better). Cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 
2187 (1989) (suggesting Rule 24(a)(2)'s application in ways favorable to civil rights liti-
gation would require rewriting rather than interpretation). 
378 These are not the only areas in which problems cluster or the sole way to classify 
the difficulties. For example, the problems could be parsed in terms of timing: pretrial, 
trial, post-liability stage, post-judgment. Concomitantly, public interest litigation princi-
pally implicates party problems, while institutional litigation primarily involves ques-
tions of relief. 
379 See supra note 376 and accompanying text; if. Resnik, supra note 136. at 444 
(courts engage in managerial judging with little reflection on cumulative effects for ad-
versary system or specific types of litigation). 
380 See, e.g., supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (suggesting courts abandon 
heightened pleading requirements imposed under Rule 8 because they contravene 
Rules' letter and spirit and other mechanisms available to achieve similar results); supra 
note 377; Tobias, supra note 77 (suggesting courts abandon public rights exception to 
Rule 19 because judges can reach equally satisfactory results by applying existing rule 
and considering all relevant factors the rule requires to be considered); but see Eisen v. 
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-77 (1974) (Rule 23(c)(2)'s notice requirements 
cannot be read more flexibly). But if. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2187 (1989) 
(application of party joinder amendments more solicitous of civil rights litigation 
"would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation"). 
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Judges can and should accord flexible and pragmatic interpretations 
to the Rules in public law cases.381 Courts should also be sensitive 
to the special characteristics of public law litigation in contrast to 
private law litigation and should recognize the implications of apply-
ing the Rules to both types of suits.382 For instance, vindication of 
fundamental civil rights and access to the civil litigation process are 
values many believe more significant than judicial economy. Corre-
spondingly, courts ought to think imaginatively ab<?ut ways of ac-
commodating public law litigation without sacrificing important 
goals like expeditious dispute resolution. Courts could do so by ap-
plying mechanisms currently provided in numerous Rules, by em-
ploying the techniques tailored to specific types of litigation in the 
Manual for Complex Litigation, or by creating new procedural 
approaches. 383 
Certain of these suggestions also are relevent to the Advisory 
Committee's work. It should consider carefully, and provide for, 
public law litigation in the normal course of proposing amendments 
to specific Rules. Although the Advisory Committee, in the 1983 
amendments and in its attempts to revise Rule 68, appeared insuffi-
ciently sensitive to public law litigation, the Committee can and 
should be more alert to public interest litigants' needs when con-
templating future change. For example, it should remember that 
Rules which appear neutral can have different, and often dispropor-
tionate, impact on these litigants because of resource constraints. 384 
Congress should maintain as much interest in rulemaking, and 
381 See supra note 338 and accompanying text (Judges Friendly and Leventhal cham-
pion flexible application of Rule 24 to "other than traditional litigation."). 
382 See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text (salient characteristics of public law 
litigation). Important implications of applying the Rules to public law litigation will be 
the potential for disadvantaging public interest litigants because of their comparative 
lack of information and resources. See supra notes 251, 34 I and accompanying text. 
383 For example, under existing Rule 24, public interest litigants' need to intervene 
and parties' needs for expeditious dispute resolution can be accommodated by permit-
ting, but conditioning, the intervention. Correspondingly, ifthe remedial phase of insti-
tutional litigation is characterized by numerous parties, issues, and interests, it may be 
advisable to import techniques from administrative procedure, such as those used in 
notice-comment rulemaking. See generally United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 
F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972); Pedersen, Fonnal Records and lnfonnal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L. 
J. 38 (1975). For helpful suggestions regarding use of the Manual, see Simons, The Man-
ual for Complex Litigation, 62 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 493 (1988). 
384 The Committee's attempts to amend Rule 68, as well as the Court's application 
of that Rule in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I (1985), and its reading of the party joinder 
amendments in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), illustrate such potential impact. 
Despite both entities' protestations that their efforts were neutral, they ignored the fact 
that civil rights plaintiffs challenging state action have vastly fewer resources than de-
fendants. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 531. For an earlier, explicit refusal to take into 
account disproportionate effects on litigants with limited resources, see Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
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continue to be as solicitous of public interest litigants, as it has in 
recent years. For instance, 1988 legislative branch action moderniz-
ing the rulemaking processes will have beneficial consequences. 
Congress itself, however, may want to monitor even more closely 
judicial application, and Advisory Committee amendment, of the 
Rules and should consider modifying specific judicial or Committee 
treatment with which it disagrees. For instance, Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the interrelations between several Rules and the 
Civil Rights Fees Act may have so eroded Congress' underlying pur-
poses in passing the legislation that amendment might now be 
appropriate. 385 
B. Long-Term Suggestions 
An important preliminary conclusion about the Rules' applica-
tion to public law litigation is that we know too little to formulate 
definitive conclusions. It would be helpful to have clearer under-
standing of, and more information about, numerous considerations 
relating to the Federal Rules and to public law litigation. With that 
knowledge, even the most complex difficulties involving judicial ap-
plication should be amenable to resolution. 
1. General Information 
a. The Rules. A more comprehensive and more refined apprecia-
tion of the Rules would facilitate future work. If the "history of pro-
cedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the 
preceding generation's procedural reforms,"386 and American 
proceduralists essentially tinker with the Rules in a never-ending cy-
cle, 387 the Rules' history assumes considerable importance. Recent 
research, although helpful, creates its own difficulty by positing mul-
tiple, inconsistent accounts. Thus, these histories warrant attempts 
at reconciliation, while new work proceeds on the Rules. 
The value choices reflected in the Rules must be explored, be-
cause they are crucial to judicial application. Were the 1938 Rules 
meant to be trans-substantive, to treat plaintiffs and defendants 
more equally, to favor merits resolution after full disclosure through 
discovery, to assimilate law into equity, or to increase judicial con-
385 The Court interpretations are Marek and Evans. Cf Court Upholds Use of Rights 
Law But Limits How It Can Be Applied, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1989, at Al, Al2, col. 3 
(members of Congress will draft and support legislation meant to overturn recent court 
decisions on civil rights mentioned supra note 284). 
386 Resnik, supra note 365, at 1030. 
387 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 494; if. Stewart, supra note 51, at 1779 (similar ideas 
regarding administrative procedure). 
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trol?388 lf the answers are affirmative, are they true today, and, if so, 
what are their implications for modern litigation?389 
There should be additional work on the Rules as a set of litigat-
ing principles and on specific areas of procedure and particular 
Rules. For instance, were the party joinder Rules as drafted initially, 
and even as amended in 1966, premised on a vision of litigation 
which involves thousands of geographically dispersed parties and 
hundreds of complex issues?390 lf not, is mor~ change now 
indicated? 
The rulemaking process itself warrants additional work, 
although recent Congressional efforts to modernize the procedures 
should yield improvements. From that work, a jurisprudence of 
rulemaking should be developed. Courts, the Advisory Committee, 
and commentators should explore in greater detail whether more 
precise Rules can be written; if that proves impossible, what mecha-
nisms could restrain the substantial judicial discretion afforded by 
the "general charters that today masquerade as rules"?391 Some re-
cent Advisory Committee activity could have empowered the federal 
judiciary at the expense of litigants and Congress. 392 The two abor-
tive attempts to amend Rule 68 illustrate the effects of being insuffi-· 
ciently attentive to institutional responsibilities for rule-amending, 
to Congressional policies underlying fee-shifting legislation, and to 
the polycentric nature of rule-amending activity.393 
388 Correspondingly, were the 1938 drafters animated by New-Deal reformist ten-
dencies, Realism, and professionalism? The answers probably are all of the above. 
389 For instance, if the original drafters favored a strong federal government be-
cause they viewed it as beneficent, what does that mean in the modern administrative 
state in which government is considered to be "part of the problem" by everyone from 
Ronald Reagan to Ralph Nader? Research on the Rules' history might fall within the 
ambit of work on the federal courts' history recently authorized by Congress. See H.R. 
REP. No. 100-889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 5982, 6008-09. 
390 Professor Miller persuasively argues that the 1966 drafters may not have contem-
plated Professor Resnik's "Calder-like configurations we call cases today." See Miller, 
supra note l 03, at 669-76; see general(}' Resnik, supra note 3, at 502 n.30. Cf. Pub. L. No. 
100-702, §§ 201-03, 102 Stat. 4646 (1988) (recent Congressional attempt to treat analo-
gous party problems in mass accident context). 
391 Burbank, supra note 35, at 1474; cf. Diver, The Optimal Precisio11 of .4dministratit•e 
Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (I983) (general discussion of difficulty in writing precise Rules). 
392 See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text (Rule 68); Burbank, supra note 251 
(same); Burbank, SanctiollS in the Proposed Amendme11ts to the Federal Rules of Citiil Prncedure: 
Some QuestiollS About Power, I I HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (I983) (Rule I I). 
393 See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text (Rule 68 and fee-shifting legisla-
tion); Friedenthal, supra note I2 (discussion of institutional rulemaking responsibilities); 
Fuller, The Forms a11d Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 393-405 (1978) (discus-
sion ofpolycentricity). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged that rulemak-
ing has been "substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have 
important effects on the substantive rights oflitigants.' 0 Mistretta v. United States, 109 
S. Ct. 647, 665 n.I9 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
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The process of rules revision should receive even greater scru-
tiny. Professor Lewis recently assessed those procedures and found 
that the "current institutional rulemaking machinery is plainly inad-
equate to the task of initiating needed proposals for the study of 
particular rules," and recommended that Congress reexamine the 
amendment process and reformulate or revitalize the existing mech-
anisms to make them more responsive to developments in litiga-
tion. 394 Other observers have suggested democratizing the 
Committee's composition or the rule-amending process by, for in-
stance, appointing representatives of public interest litigants to the 
Committee or employing procedures similar to notice-comment 
rulemaking for rule-amending.395 In 1988, Congress modernized 
the rulemaking procedures, while the judicial Conference recently 
has modified certain of its rulemaking processes.396 
b. Public Law Litigation. Although commentators have undertaken 
much valuable theoretical research into public law litigation and cer-
tain forms of such litigation now appear institutionalized, there is 
compelling need for a more thorough and refined appreciation of 
the theory and practice of public law litigation (a public law jurisprn-
dence). Enhanced understanding would facilitate efforts to ascer-
tain whether the litigation actually differs from private law cases in 
significant ways and whether it warrants special consideration under 
the Rules. 
An attempt should be made to define public law litigation in 
terms of numerous salient characteristics. Because one definition 
cannot encompass the diverse forms that are included within the ru-
bric of public law litigation, it is preferable to speak of salient or 
defining characteristics of that litigation. 397 
394 Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15( c) and its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1508-09, 1573 (1987). Another writer even more recently ob-
served that Rule 11 's 1983 amendment specifically and rulemaking generally have not 
been premised on sufficient data. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Proce-
dure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 6, notes 5-10, 83-87 and accompanying 
text (forthcoming 1989). 
395 For contrasting views of democratization, compare Hazard, supra note 39, at 1291-
92, 1294 with Lesnick, supra note 152, at 580-81. Cf. Burbank, supra note 394, at note 81 
(need to expand membership in club and expand activities beyond library); supra note 
383 (notice-comment rulemaking procedures). 
396 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74, 2077 (1989) (Congressional modernization); R. 
COVER, 0. Fiss &J. RESNIK, supra note 39, at 1810 (recent judicial Conference modifica-
tion). See, e.g., Procedures for the Conduct of Business By the judicial Conference Committees On 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 120 F.R.D. 395 (1988). 
397 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 3. A number of these characteristics were examined 
above. See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text. Efforts should continue, however, 
to develop others. Cf. Abraham, supra note 160, at 849-83 (recent example in mass tort 
context). 
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Creating some typologies also should be useful.398 For in-
stance, a typology of parties could be created. It might be helpful to 
categorize public interest litigants in terms of the individuals or in-
terests the litigants represent; their areas of substantive expertise, 
such as natural resource preservation or consumer protection; or 
their principal purposes, such as litigating or lobbying legislatures 
or agencies.399 
Developing a clearer vocabulary applicable to public law litiga-
tion will help judges, lawyers, and litigants talk more intelligently 
and intelligibly about the phenomenon. Available sources, such as 
judicial opinions and other legal writing4°0 and work in non-legal 
fields,401 can provide this vocabulary. A better appreciation of how 
certain aspects of public law litigation compare with their analogues 
in private law litigation should help to create the vocabulary. For 
example, if a dispute about public policy is considered the subject 
matter of a lawsuit, while a moral interest is deemed sufficient to 
participate in litigation, those concepts are considerably less tangi-
ble in public than in private law litigation.402 Other disciplines can 
clarify understandings of concepts used imprecisely in law. For in-
stance, conventional wisdom in the fields of political science and 
theory has suggested for some time that the "public interest" which 
the government claims to represent is best comprehended as con-
sisting of numerous private interests.403 This insight might mean 
that under Rule 24 the government should be considered an "ade-
quate representative" of public interest litigants less often than 
before.404 Moreover, it may be worthwhile to create new terminol-
398 Typologies are classification schemes employing subcategorization. Typologies 
could be useful in numerous ways. For example, on a practical level, a more sophisti-
cated understanding of public interest litigants could help judges more effectively re-
solve Rule 24 intervention requests or construct representational frameworks in 
institutional litigation. 
399 I realize that certain considerations, such as public interest litigants• resources 
and funding sources which may be relevant to some Rules· application, could implicate 
privacy concerns. See Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal 
Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEO. LJ. 51. 102-08 (1981). 
400 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 311-44; Chayes. Foreword. supra note 2; Chayes, 
Public Law Litigation, supra note 2; Fallon, supra note 3; Fiss • .. 1.gainst Settlement, supra note 
55. 
401 See, e.g .• M. DAN-COHEN. RIGHTS. PERSONS, ANO ORGANIZATIONS (1986); M. OL-
SON, THE LOGIG OF CoLLECTl\'E ACTION (1965); G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
(1962). 
402 Compare the interest considered sufficient to intervene in Sagebrush Rebellion. 
Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1983) with the "property .. spoken of in Rule 
24, supra note 311. 
403 See. e.g .• G. SCHUBERT. supra note 401; Gellhom, supra note 81. at 360 (concern 
for the environment. for example). 
404 Nonetheless, courts have continued to find the government an adequate repre-
sentative of public interest litigants that seek to represent the public interest. See supra 
notes 330-34 and accompanying text. 
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ogy to describe public law litigation. For example, Professor Chayes 
coined the term public law litigation in 1976,405 while Professor Fiss 
has employed the term structural reform to describe certain types of 
institutional litigation.406 It may now be appropriate to develop a 
"public law vision" of the Rules-one that simultaneously facilitates 
public interest litigants' vindication of important social values and 
takes into account the factors the Rules contemplate will be 
considered. 
A catalog of the advantages and disadvantages of public law liti-
gation should be compiled. 4 0 7 The very effort to define advantages 
and disadvantages may reflect political perspectives. For instance, 
public law litigation, which substantially improves the quality of an 
Interior Department decision to lease public lands, by affording en-
dangered species of wildlife greater protection, but delays natural 
resource development on those lands for three years, could appear 
beneficial or detrimental depending on one's political viewpoint.408 
Even objectively identifiable advantages and disadvantages can pose 
difficulties, such as quantifying them for purposes of comparison. 
Nonetheless, there should be more work, especially aiming to iden-
tify additional benefits and costs, attempting to assign them weight 
in terms of relative importance, and refining understanding of their 
meaning.409 For example, in litigation between the government and 
industry, numerous public interest litigants may have a strong inter-
est in intervening to present their views, while the original parties 
could be as concerned about expeditious dispute resolution.410 
These conflicting interests might be accommodated by permitting 
one public interest litigant to intervene on behalf of all such litigants 
9r by conditioning the participation of those allowed to 
intervene.411 
405 See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2. 
406 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 2. 
407 The principal benefit of public law litigation seems to be the improved decision-
making of governmental institutions, while the principal detriments appear to be disrup-
tion of the institutions' operations and delay attributable to litigation. 
408 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern Alaska 
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986). 
409 See Brunet, Study in the Allocation of Scarce judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal 
Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978) (helpful effort in the context of Rule 24). 
41 O The judiciary will share these interests in securing information to make the best 
decisions and in promptly concluding disputes. Perhaps the best treatment of these and 
additional concerns is Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v. Hooker Chems. & 
Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 
F.2d 525, 530-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (helpful analysis of these and related concerns). 
411 See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380, 383 
(1987) (Brennan,]., concurring) (discussion of analogous possibilities and their benefits 
and disadvantages); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 419-20 (D. 
Minn. 1972) (same). 
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There should be attempts to reach more differentiated, refined 
understandings of public law litigation, particularly by placing in 
context numerous considerations delineat~d. For instance, public 
interest litigation primarily implicates party problems, while institu-
tional reform litigation principally involves remedial questions.412 
Moreover, most public law litigation is imbued with process values, 
such as interests in participation and dignity, which means that it 
generally will be a less appropriate candidate for settlement than in 
other litigation.413 · 
2. Specific Infonnation 
Information on federal civil litigation relevant to public law liti-
gation and to the Rules should be explored. The Annual Reports of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the efforts 
of the Federal Judicial Center provide valuable information and 
promising points of departure, although additional sources should 
be consulted.414 Some existing work includes general characteriza-
tions of the quantity of public law litigation.415 Analysis of the perti-
nent information, which is tailored to public law litigation, however, 
is warranted. For instance, although data are available on the 
number of class actions filed annually, relatively little is known 
about the type of class actions these are, and class action suits com-
promise a comparatively small number of public law cases pur-
sued.416 Additional information relating to the following concerns 
would help facilitate future work: the Federal Rules under which 
problems arise for public literest litigants, why and how the difficul-
412 These characteristics are not always true. For instance, certain forms of institu-
tional litigation can pose complex party problems involving adequate representation of 
affected interests, see Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982), 
and the generation of authoritative consent, see Fiss, Against Selllemmt, supra note 55, at 
1078-82. 
413 See supra note 82 (litigation imbued with process values); supra note 254 (public 
law litigation inappropriate candidate for settlement). 
414 See T. Willging, supra note 196 (example of recent Rule 11 study conducted 
under Federaljudicial Center auspices). The data relied upon in compiling the MANUAL 
FOR COMPl.EX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) and those used in completing the American 
Law lnstitute's 1987 PRELIMINAR\" Sn•DY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [hereinafter ALI 
Sruov] should be helpful. Moreover, Congress recently established a Federal Courts 
Study Committee which should generate valuable data. See Federal Courts Study Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644-45 (1988). For helpful discussion of difficulties 
entailed in empirical inquiry, see Marcus, supra note 136. at 686-91. 
415 Compare Resnik, supra note 3. at 511 ("statistical rarities on the federal docket") 
with Fiss. Against Selllement, supra note 55, at 1087 ("probably dominate the docket of a 
modem court system"). This discrepancy, however, appears attributable partly to the 
definition used. 
4 rn For helpful nascent efforts. and suggestions for the future. see Chayes. Public Law 
Litigation, supra note 2, at 1303; Simon, supra note 241, at 63 n.286. Cf supra note 164 
and accompanying text (class action data). 
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ties are created, the frequency with which they occur, the individuals 
and entities affected, and how federal courts have addressed the 
problems.417 It is equally important to identify considerations perti-
nent to treatment of the difficulties, especially conflicts between 
public interest litigants' full participation in federal litigation and 
other goals of the civil justice system, such as judicial economy and 
fairness to parties. There should be estimates of the capacity of ex-
isting Rules or ancillary procedural mechanisms, such as provisions 
of the United States Code, to ameliorate or solve the problems.418 
If these measures are found deficient, the difficulties entailed should 
be compiled and preliminary surveys of potential solutions ought to 
be undertaken. 
C. More Definitive Conclusions and a Look Into the Future 
When all of the information is collected and evaluated, more 
accurate conclusions in certain areas should follow. A significant 
question will be whether public law litigation differs from private 
suits in ways that warrant special consideration. At this juncture, 
some qualitative dimensions should supplement the quantitative 
material. Thus, even if public law cases are "statistical rarities on 
the federal docket,"419 those suits' importance to the public may 
warrant special treatment. This significance may be gauged in terms 
of the public's interest in resolving controversial issues of great mo-
ment or the litigation's "impact on society and on attitudes toward 
the judicial function and role."420 In light of the experience with 
the Rules' application described above and conservative prediction 
as to the future, public law litigation appears to differ from private 
disputes in ways that call for distinctive consideration under certain 
and perhaps all of the Rules.421 
The more difficult question is what treatment to accord public 
417 The analysis of judicial application of numerous Rules in the second section of 
this Article could serve as a starting point. For instance, that assessment indicates that 
Rules 16, 26, and 56 are promising candidates for future work. 
418 The ALI STUDY, supra note 414, at 7, found that the strength and weaknesses of 
existing mechanisms afforded a "context for potentially valuable procedural reforms." 
419 Resnik, supra note 3, at 51 I. I am not implying that Professor Resnik downplays 
the qualitative dimension. 
420 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1303; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra 
note 55, at 1087. 
421 This conclusion is reasonable, even if the qualitative dimension, mentioned, 
supra notes 419-20 and accompanying text, is discounted. Inclusion of the qualitative 
element could be criticized as loading the question, although it actually responds in part 
to concerns regarding the legitimacy of public law litigation, allowing for negative reso-
lution of the issue on that basis. Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2187 (1989) (re-
fusal to accord civil rights litigation special consideration under party joinder 
amendments). 
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law litigation.122 The answer will depend on numerous considera-
tions applicable to specific Rules, to procedural areas, and to the 
Rules as a whole. One important set of factors involves the number 
and gravity of perceived problems, such as the Rules' language or 
judicial application, and the difficulties' amenability to amelioration 
or solution. Other relevant considerations include: the political 
and practical realities of implementing potential solutions and the 
receptivity of entities, such as the federal judiciary, the Advisory 
Committee, and Congress, responsible for instituting the requisite 
change. 
These factors demand specific contextual analyses of variables 
relevant to each Rule and procedural area as well as a general over-
view. For example, problems resulting from deficient phrasing of 
Rules can be rectified easily with amendments by the Advisory Com-
mittee or by Congress.423 Correspondingly, if the difficulties are at-
tributable to judicial enforcement and courts are responsive to 
applying the Rules with increased solicitude for public interest liti-
gants, the solutions should be relatively straightforward. For in-
stance, judges should abandon the "public rights exceptiOn" and 
apply Rule 19 to resolve the pertinent party joinder question while 
drawing on administrative law procedures to create representative 
party frameworks in the remedial phase of institutional litigation.424 
If, however, the problems are more structural or systemic, in that 
the Rules as a set of litigating principles fail to accommodate effec-
tively public law litigation or the federaljudiciary is not receptive to 
applying the Rules with greater concern for public interest litigants, 
more fundamental change, such as promulgating a separate set of 
Rules for public law litigation, may be indicated.425 
CONCLUSION 
The fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
has afforded an opportune occasion to analyze the federal judici-
422 Cf. ALI STUDY. supra note 414, at 239 (indicating comprehensive solution possi-
ble in area of complex litigation). 
423 It appears that few such problems will be found. See supra note 377 and accompa-
nying text. Even Rule 24(a)(2), which was widely criticized as flawed in the amending, 
has not yet been deemed sufficiently troubling to require consideration of a possible 
amendment. Cf. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187 (suggesting application of Rule 24(a)(2) 
more favorable to civil rights litigation would require rewriting). 
424 See supra note 379 (Rule 19); supra note 383 (representative party frameworks in 
institutional litigation). 
425 See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187 (indicating Supreme Court's lack of receptivity to 
applying Rules with greater solicitude for civil rights litigation); Brazil, supra note 69, at 
399-402 (discussion of separate procedural tracks); McGovern, supra note 69, at 478-91 
(same); but see Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1087-89 (criticism of the two-track 
idea). 
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ary's application of numerous Rules to public law litigation. The 
evaluation indicates that many courts have enforced a number of 
Rules in ways that adversely affect public interest litigants. It also 
shows that federal judges can and should apply the Rules with con-
siderably more solicitude for public interest litigants as the second 
half-century of the Rules' application opens. 
